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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

We  “the  People”
Nordic right wing populist parties have a relatively large voter base and claim
international  legitimacy  by  the  very  fact  that  they  are  not  products  of  a  “revisionist  
agenda.”1 Unlike similar parties in Austria or Germany with their roots in fascism or
naziism, Nordic right wing populist parties steer clear of these infamous labels from
Europe’s  past.  However,  the  mass  murder  committed  by  a  Norwegian  Progressive  Party  
member in the summer of 2011 exemplifies the unavoidable danger of right-wing
populist rhetoric, no matter its historic roots. While traditional European populists stood
against  the  elite  as  a  way  of  gaining  the  political  support  of  ‘the  people,’    twenty-first
century right-wing  populism  defines  ‘the  people’  along  ethnic,  national  and  religious  
lines  to  ‘otherize’    immigrants  as  threats  to  their  country’s  specific  culture.2 It does not
shun its anti-elitist background, but casts the elite as the perceived profiteers of
globalization  who  benefit  financially  from  the  presence  of  the  ‘other.’34 Unfortunately, in
the wake of heightened immigration from  Arab  countries,  the  ‘other’  is  increasingly  
portrayed by European right-wing populists as Muslim immigrants and their descendants.

1

Anton  Pelinka,  “Right-Wing  Populism:  Concept  and  Typology”  In  Right-Wing Populism in
Europe:Politics and Discourse, ed. Ruth Wodak, et al. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) 14.
2

Pelinka, 7.

3

Ibid.

4

Ruth  Wodak,  “‘Anything  Goes!’- The Haiderization of  Europe.”  In  Right-Wing Populism in
Europe:Politics and Discourse, ed. Ruth Wodak, et al. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 26.
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In other words, right-wing populists offer themselves as defenders of European
democracy against the encroaching globalization of Islamism.5
The  chronic  ‘othering’  of  immigrants  is  the  modern  ticking  bomb  in  European  
politics. However, before tackling the problem, it is crucial to understand its roots.
Nordic right-wing  populism  began  in  Denmark.  The  Danish  People’s  Party, the DPP, was
established in 1995, but gained parliamentary influence from 2001 to 2011 under the
coalition  government  of  the  Liberal  and  Conservative  People’s  Parties  which  relied  on  
the DPP to gain the requisite support for premiership. The rapid rise of the DPP has
reflected a growing trend of Islamophobia among the Danish electorate and more
importantly, it began the perilous trend of right wing populist parties in Nordic
countries.6 Therefore, this paper will attempt to chronicle the influence of the DPP in
Denmark to exemplify the power of the Islamophobic rhetoric of right wing populism on
public policy.
The growth of anti-immigration sentiment in Denmark is particularly startling
when one considers the international attention Denmark receives for representing the
pinnacle  of  good  governance.  Forbes  Magazine  has  ranked  it  first  in  its  list  of  “world’s  
most responsible governments.7”  The  Economist  placed  Denmark  at  number  five  on  its  

5

Pelinka,12.

6

Ibid.

7

Kenneth  Rapoza,  “The  Worlds  10  Most  Responsible  Governments,”  Forbes, November 29, 2012,
accessed November 2, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/11/29/the-worlds-10-mostresponsible-governments/.
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list  of  “where  to  be  born  in  2013.8”  Furthermore,  it  recently  regained its position as the
“world’s  happiest  country.”9 With one of the oldest democracies in the world, Denmark
has long been a beacon of liberal democratic ideals and a model for the welfare state.10
Considering  Denmark’s  global  recognition  for  good  governance, the integration of
Muslims into Danish society represents the integration of immigrants into the small,
welfare state in the wake of globalization. Furthermore, the rise of the DPP exemplifies a
larger European effort to portray the immigration of Muslims to Europe as a collision of
Islamism and democracy in what could also be understood as a form of neo-racism, or in
the context of this paper, Islamophobia.
I will focus on three sectors of Danish society: the media, social services and the
refugee and asylum system to exemplify the effects of the Islamophobic rhetoric of the
DPP on Danish public policy. The rise in power of right wing populism in Denmark has
direct and profound implications on the ability to effectively integrate Muslim
immigrants into Danish society. In other words, in Denmark, extreme rhetoric is not
confined to the fringes of the political spectrum, but rather reflected in governmental
action. I will uncover the specific policies that have been formed from right wing populist
rhetoric to specifically target Muslims living in Denmark to conclude that the Danish

8

Laza,  Kekic,  “The  lottery  of  life:  Where  to  be  born  in  2013.”  The Economist, November 21, 2012,
accessed November 2, 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/21566430-where-be-born-2013-lottery-life.
9

John  F.  Helliwell  and  Shun  Wang,  “World  Happiness:  Trends,  Explanations  and  Distribution”  in  World
Happiness Report 2013, ed. John Helliwell, et al. (New York: UN Sustainable Development Solutions
Network, 2013), 8-37.
10

Nichols Aylott, Magnus Blomgren and Torbjorn  Bergman,  “Denmark:  Party  Agents  on  Tight  Leashes”  
In Political Parties in Multi-Level Polities: The Nordic Countries Compared, (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013), 51.
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government is undergoing a threatening change in its values in order to protect an illdefined  “Danish  way  of  life.”

Roadmap
Firstly, Chapter 2 will look at the Danish media and its close ties to the right
wing government. This will help explain why there is a long history of the negative
portrayal of Islam in Danish media. I will pay special attention to the controversial
Muhammad Cartoon scandal of 2005 and evaluate the responses to the controversy in
Nyborg Fængsel to exemplify the direct and detrimental effects of Danish media on the
proliferation of the right-wing populist agenda. I will argue that the crisis was
exacerbated by a poor governmental response from the Prime Minister, Anders Fogh
Rasmussen, whose Liberal Party had close political ties to the DPP. In many ways the
2005 crisis was a direct result of policy reflecting right wing populist rhetoric. Both the
current infatuation with Muslims in fiction and the Muslim-as-a-victim paradigm in the
news hint that media discrimination against Muslims is changing, but not necessarily for
the better.
Chapter  3  will  then  evaluate  Muslim  immigrants’  relation  to  social  services  and  
their effects on the stability of the welfare state. The welfare state has an interesting
influence on integration because of its involvement in the private sphere. I will discuss
how the DPP has morphed its platform from anti-welfare state to anti-immigration and
how this shift has affected these specific social services: refugee benefits, transnational
7

marriage, and education. These three areas of the welfare state have undergone policy
changes to the specific detriment of Muslim immigrants and their descendants. I will
conclude this section with a discussion of the welfare state in the wake of globalization to
argue that the proper integration of immigrants could strengthen the system in the long
run. A prevailing right wing populist rhetoric that actively suppresses Danish Muslim
immigrants and their descendants will cause the more successful immigrants to emigrate
before they have the opportunity to give back to the welfare system that had supported
them.
Chapter 4 will follow the transformation of the Danish refugee and asylum system
from one of  the  most  liberal  systems  in  the  world  to  one  of  the  world’s  strictest.  This  
dramatic  transformation  began  with  a  new  “Alien  Package”  introduced  by  the  LiberalConservative coalition with adamant DPP support. The Package has greatly effected the
access to asylum, permanent residence and eventual citizenship of refugees. Meanwhile,
the stifling living situations of refugees in legal limbo, in the confines of refugee camps,
and regulations that seem to specifically target Muslim refugees has continued to
undermine  any  chances  of  Muslim  refugee’s  future  integration  into  Danish  society.  The  
direction of the Danish refugee and asylum system has been internationally criticized as
in-compliant with international and European human rights conventions. As a result,
Denmark’s  unwelcome  stance  towards  refugees  could  have  the  dual  effect  of  ostracizing  
Muslim refugees from Danish society and of ostracizing the Danish state from
international legislature.

8

Finally, I will conclude by discussing the current and future state of Denmark.
After summarizing the findings from the previous chapters, I will give a brief explanation
of why right wing populism remains so alluring to the Danish electorate. Then I will
question the current left wing government that took power in 2011. I will also question
the lack of academic research regarding immigrants and Muslims in Denmark since the
shock  of  the  2005  “Cartoon  Crisis”  has  subsided.  I  predict  that  the  current  government’s  
unpopularity will lead to a renewed power of the DPP. Furthermore, I suggest that, in
order for integrationist policies to be effective and for Denmark to remain an active
member of the international and European community, the DPP redefine its
understanding  of  “Danishness”  to  include  Muslim  immigrants  and  their  descendants,
distancing itself from the dangerous power of right wing populist rhetoric.
To understand the issues surrounding Muslim integration I will refer to literature
analyzing these three Danish sectors and question their integrationist impact on Muslim
immigrants and their descendants. To further my research, I will refer to data taken from
my project in the summer of 2012 in which I spent two months living within the grounds
of a Danish Prison, Nyborg Fængsel. In addition to a wide range of literature on my
specific policy sections, my work includes data from a mass survey sent to employees of
the kriminalforsorgen, the prison service, and my own observations from my days in
Nyborg Fængsel which will be referred to as a loose microcosm for Danish society as a
whole.
Before embarking on an in-depth analysis of Danish media, social services and
refugee and asylum system, I will offer a brief overview of the validity of analyzing a
9

prison as a microcosm, Danish culture in general and the complexities of Denmark’s  
coalition government. This background information will help provide context for the
dangerous rise of right-wing populism as a direct threat to Muslim immigrants in
Denmark.

10

CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT

What makes a Prison relevant?
While I have a dual citizenship and have spent a good portion of my life in
Denmark, my research at Nyborg Fængsel gave me a unique insight into Danish society
in a small, somewhat controllable setting. My observations and surveys there deserve
attention. I believe that a prison can serve as an apt microcosm for the society lying
outside its walls. The father of this theory is Donald Clemmer, author of the influential
sociological book, The Prison Community.
The Prison Community discusses the prison as a microcosm for broader society.
While  Clemmer’s  thesis  centers  on  an  American  prison,  the  notion  of  a  prison  as  a  
microcosm can hold true for nearly any society that has an established and respected
judicial  system.  However,  the  “diversification  of  economic  activities”  that  make  an  
American prison representative of American society are prevalent, and arguably more
pronounced, in Danish prisons.11 The Danish prison system functions on the premise of
normalization, that is, simulating the outside Danish society.12 Danish prisoners can take
classes in a range of subjects, work in several different workshops, can cook for
themselves, have multiple visitations from the outside, they can wear and buy their own

11

Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community (San Diego: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1958), 7.

12

Kriminalforgsen,  “A  Programme  of  Principles  for  Prison  and  Probation  Work  in  Denmark,”  Handbook  
from the Ministry of Justice Department of Prisons and Probation, Nyborg, 2008, 10.
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clothing, and in some cases, leave prison grounds for important social events.13 While
this process of normalization may seem exceedingly liberal to a number of readers, the
point I am making is that it offers a rare, semi-controlled environment to research the
intricacies of Danish society.
Many other scholars have taken this theory into their own academic
understandings of the prison. Most notably, in Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the
Prison, Michel Foucault explores the developments in punishment and the establishment
of  “panoptic”  prisons  as  a  representation  of larger  changes  in  the  “disposition  of  centers  
and  channels  of  power.”14 He  argues  that  scholars  must  view  punishment  as  a  “political  
tactic”  and  implores  that  his  readers  understand  the  societal  implications  of  punishment.  
In his words, he wants us  to  “hear  the  distant  roar  of  the  battle.”15 Other examples include
Ann Goeting who draws on these understandings of a prison to describe the racism,
sexism, and ageism prevalent in American prisons as a reflection of greater American
society.16 Loïc Wacquant argues that more funding should be given to the study of
prisons  because  it  can  be  “investigated  both as a microcosm endowed with a distinctive
material and symbolic tropism and as template or vector of broader social forces,

13

See Appendix A for observations of daily prison life.

14

Alan Sheridan trans., Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Random House, 1977),
205.
15

Sheridan, 305.

16

Ann  Goeting,  “Racism,  Sexism  and  Ageism  in  the  Prison  Community,”  Federal Probation 10 (1985):
19, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fedpro49&div=43&g_sent=1&collection=
journals#188.
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political nexi, and cultural processes that traverse its walls.”17 With these ideas in mind, I
contend that looking at a Danish prison can help one better understand complex issues in
broader Danish society.
Naturally, there are limitations in using prison research as evidence about trends
in Danish society. Firstly, and most importantly, the inmates are in prison because they
broke the law, and by extension, do not fit into society and its norms. Therefore, their
ethnic or religious tensions may not speak for all of Danish society. Clemmer concedes
that  a  criminal  does  not  fit  within  his  rule  bound  society  and  therefore  represents  “the  
sheer individualist.”18 To avoid misunderstanding Danish society, most of this paper is
dedicated to reviewing supplementary literature, policies and political trends. This
literary research demonstrates that my research conclusions within the prison mirrors, to
some extent, beliefs and prejudices outside prison walls.
I must also permit the notion that some of my observations and survey responses
could be distorted. While I tried to blend in as much as possible into the daily life of
prison culture, my advanced, but not fluent, Danish language skills and relatively short
two-month stay undoubtedly distinguished me as a visitor. Also, the Institutional Review
Board  for  ethical  research  prohibits  interviewing  and  surveying  “vulnerable  subjects”  
such as prisoners. Instead I had to change my project so that I observed prisoners and
surveyed prison guards. My observations mostly stem from visits to an on-site drug
treatment center where I ate many of my meals and engaged in several meaningful
17

Loïc  Wacquant,  “The  Curious  Eclipse  of  Prison  Ethnography  in  the  Age  of  Mass  Incarceration,”  
Ethnography 3:4 (2001):371, doi:10.1177/1466138102003004012.
18

Clemmer, 6.

13

conversations with the inmates.19 Although, a project that surveyed inmates would have
been ideal, I think my prison guard survey, which was answered by over 75 prison
service employees who deal with prisoners on a daily basis, can give insight into the
habits  of  the  prisoners.  Furthermore,  the  prison  guards’  free  response  answers  
demonstrate  Danish  prejudices  and  beliefs  in  this  “prison-as-a-microcosm”  paradigm.20
Therefore, despite several drawbacks, my research can still provide insight into the
growth of Islamophobia in Denmark.
In my research I discovered the prisoners of non-Danish ethnicities, especially
those who identified as Muslims, were largely ostracized from the rest of the prison
“society”  reflecting  a  trend  in  Denmark:  A  prevailing  right  wing  populist  rhetoric  that  
actively suppresses Danish Muslim immigrants and their descendants. However, before
beginning I would like to quote Clemmer in stating that my research is “in  no  sense...an  
attack on prisons, the people in them, or the ones who manage them. The prison world is
interpreted as a natural outgrowth of social trends...21”  In  other  words,  I  am  not  writing  
this to critique the prison system, but rather to learn about ethnic tensions in Danish
society and to try to connect my findings to a larger European political climate, the rise of
right-wing populism.

19

See Appendix A for observations of daily prison life.

20

See Appendix B for further detail on Prison survey responses.

21

Clemmer, xvi.
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A numbers game
It is important to discuss why Muslim immigrants bear the brunt of xenophobic
criticism. In addition to the rise of right-wing populism, there are two factors that need to
be addressed: the perceived threat of a large number of immigrants and, even more
importantly, the pronounced cultural divergences.
Like many, small welfare states, Denmark’s  first  wave  of  mass  immigration  lasted  
from the 1960s to the early 1970s. Turkey, Pakistan, Yugoslavia and Morocco were
among the first countries to experience an exodus of citizens to Denmark. There were
simply not enough Danes to maintain economic growth, and these immigrants were
expected  to  fill  the  labor  gap.  They  were  deemed  “guest  workers,”  but  most  stayed  and  
eventually became citizens. While there are no specific numbers on the guest worker
population of this era, it is estimated that these four nationalities constituted around
15,000 citizens.22 The largest demographic of guest workers were Turkish and today their
descendants constitute nearly 55,000, or 12 %, of all foreigners in Denmark.23 Next to
Turkish, which is by far the largest demographic, the top five immigrant nationalities in
Denmark are Iraqi, German, Lebanese, Bosnian and Pakistanis24.
While Denmark does not record demographics of religion, I will assume that most
of all the immigrants from Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Pakistan, Somalia, Palestine and

22

Ulf  Hedetoft,  “Denmark:  Integrating  Immigrants  into  a  Homogenous  Welfare  State,”  Migration Policy
Institute, November 1, 2006, accessed November 3, 2013, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/denmarkintegrating-immigrants-homogeneous-welfare-state/.
23

Ibid.

24

Ibid.
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Morocco, all countries with a pronounced immigrant population in Denmark, are Muslim.
This comes from the fact that 99.8% of Turkish citizens, 97% of Iraqis, 87% of Syrians,
99.4% of Iranians, 97 % of Pakistanis, 99% of Somalis and 99% of Moroccans are
Muslim25. In addition to the large population of Turks, Iraqis and Pakistanis, DanishMuslim understanding has been exacerbated by a string of Middle Eastern and African
crises that have led to mass immigrations. However, as my research will present, these
groups of immigrants received generally unwelcome greetings from Danish society.
After the atrocities of WWII, Denmark was internationally acclaimed for its fierce
protection of its Jewish citizens. The majority of the small population of Jews was able to
escape to Sweden under Danish tutelage. Historian Dr. Judith S. Goldstein began her
prestigious  NGO,  Humanity  in  Action,  based  on  these  “courageous”  actions26. The
United States Holocaust Museum recognizes Danish bravery during this horrific era.27 In
addition to trying to save the Jews, Denmark had an infamous underground resistance
movement which fought against the Nazi regime, the only oppressors to ever occupy
Denmark in Danish history. However, after the War, the Danish government denied entry
to Jewish immigrants during their diaspora.28 This might be due to the fact that the

25

The World Factbook 2013-14, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.
Note that the demographic for Palestinian Muslims is undocumented, but, for the purpose of this paper,
Palestinian immigrants will be understood as generally Muslim.
26

Humanity  in  Action,  “Our  History,”  accessed  November  25,  2013,  
http://www.humanityinaction.org/about/10-history.
27

Holocaust  Encyclopedia,  “Rescue  in  Denmark,”  United States Holocaust Museum, accessed November
25, 2013, http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007740.
28

Vilhjálmur  Örn  Vilhjálmsson  and  Bent  Blüdnikow,  “Rescue,  Expulsion,  and  Collaboration:
Denmark's  Difficulties  with  its  World  War  II  Past,”  Jewish Political Studies Review 18 (2006): 3-4,
http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-vilhjalmsson-f06.htm.

16

number of stateless Jews was simply considered too large in 1945. Danes will defend
their way of life above anything else and may feel jeopardized if another cultural
demographic seems overpowering. In their eyes, this is logical considering there are only
5.5 million Danish speakers in the world.29 Right wing populism has latched on to this
fear of other large cultural groups.

Defining  the  “Danish  way  of  life”
Denmark has ruled over several countries including Germany, Sweden and
Norway. Among Danes, the multinational history of their country is quickly forgotten,
while its long era of international power is not. After several battles with Germany,
Denmark’s  most  historically persistent enemy, Denmark was reduced to the small size
seen today by the middle of the 19th century. By 1864, largely in response to the growing
power  in  Germany,  Denmark  made  its  national  slogan,  “outward  losses  must  be  made  up  
for by inward gains.”30 Denmark  then  experienced  its  first  “kulturkamp,”  or  culture  war,  
in which the government focused on nationalism, the economic growth of the Danish
peasant population and the maintenance of the Danish language.31 The term
“kulturkamp”  exists  in  Danish politics to this day and even became a policy initiative
during the premiership of Fogh Rasmussen and his Liberal-Conservative coalition.

29

The World Factbook 2013-14.

30

Uffe  OsterGard,  “Denmark:  A  Big  Small  State  The  Peasant  Roots  of  Danish  Modernity”  in  National
Identity and the Varieties of Capitalism: The Danish Experience, ed. John L. Campbell, et al. (Quebec:
McGill-Queen's Press, 2006), 71.
31

Ibid.
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Since Denmark seceded land to Germany, its citizens have bragged about being
from  “a  little  land;;”  A  land  that  that has held its name for centuries and whose flag,
according  to  legend,  “fell  from  the  heavens”  in  the  year  1219.32 This pride stems from a
deeply engrained Danish culture which was largely influenced by Nikolaj Frederik
Grundtvig,  also  known  as  the  “philosopher of Danishness.”33 The Grundtvig movement
of  the  19th  century  served  to  reestablish  a  “Danish  way  of  life”  through  Danish  
translations of traditionally Nordic texts and powerful sermons.34 Grundtvig’s  speeches  
permanently changed the schooling and church systems in Denmark, but more
importantly, they defined  a  “Danish  way  of  life.35” An excerpt from his poem
“Folkeligheden,”  who’s  title  has  no  direct  English  translation,  but  means  something  
similar  to  “the  people’s  way  of  life,”  explains  permeating  Danish  nationalism:
People! what is a people?
what does popular mean?
Is it the nose or the mouth
where one discovers it?
Is it hidden from the average eye....
....Call all that is un-Danish evil,
Guardians  of  Denmark’s  native  land,
And while people have different pursuits,
All are like one another,
They have blood and ancestry in common,
The  mother  tongue  and  lion’s  courage...36
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This poem emphasizes language, loyalty and a certain sense of indigenousness, all
characteristics  of  a  Dane’s  connection  to his or her homeland. Since the early 19th
century, the Danish government has expected its citizens to share this level of
connectedness  to  a  ‘Danish  way  of  life.’  It  helps  explain  the  “peculiarity  of  Danes”  
throughout history.37 For example, their hesitance towards joining the European Union,
their determined opposition to Nazi occupation and, of course, its rise of Islamophobic
right wing populist rhetoric.38

Defending  the  “Danish  way  of  life”
Denmark’s  emphasis  on  a  prevailing  monoculture  is  explained  by its general
policy of integration over multiculturalism.39 Integration will be mentioned throughout
this paper in regards to Danish policy implementation. Unlike many of its European
counterparts, such as Sweden or the UK, Denmark has shunned the notion of
multiculturalism, the idea that wholly different cultures can live together while maintaing
their own languages, beliefs and traditions. In fact, multicultural policies are often viewed
as  “udansk,”or  “un-Danish”.40 More than anything else, immigrants are expected to
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embrace Danish culture rather than prioritize their own. However, this is particularly
difficult for Muslim immigrants.
On the official website of Denmark, it is suggested that immigrants new to
Denmark learn Danish, follow Danish traditions, and, most contrary to believers in Islam,
“Don’t  talk  too  much  about  religion.”41 Islam  is  commonly  described  as  “a  way  of  life,”  
something that effects Muslims on a day to day basis. Therefore, it is unsurprising that
the Arabic language is full of common sayings  that  mention  God.  “Inshallah,”  or  God  
willing,  is  reflexively  stated  after  any  plan,  wish  or  even  statement.  “Al-hamdulillah,”  or  
thank God, is also an extremely common saying. These colloquialisms, along with other
public displays of faith, are clearly unwelcome in Denmark. Lastly, Denmark is a country
of sarcasm. Meaning Danish humor often involves being laughed at, not with. God is not
immune to this harsh sense of humor. However, God and Muhammad are not subjects to
be trifled with among observant Muslims. This divergent understanding of humor is best
reflected in the 2006 Danish cartoon crisis which will be further expanded upon in the
“Media”  chapter.
Danish and Muslim cultures diverge on many more areas, especially in their
private lives. Firstly, Islam expects a level of modesty in dress, especially among women.
However, in Denmark, nudity is common-placed on basic cable T.V. and local beaches.
Secondly, Muslims are expected to wait until after marriage to have sex while the
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majority of Danish children are born out of wedlock.42 Islam also forbids alcohol
consumption, a staple of Danish culture. Denmark has a purchasing age of only 16, but
no drinking age, meaning children can legally drink at home. Furthermore, Danes over
the age of 15, consume an average of 14.38 liters of pure alcohol per year.43 These
cultural differences will be further explored in regards to DPP exaggeration which has
caused further fissures between Muslim and Danish cultures.
It should be noted that some scholars argue that Muslim immigrants are inherently
opposed  to  the  nature  of  integration.  In  his  essay,  “Muslims Pluralize the West, Resist
Assimilation,” Mustafa Malik contends that Muslims share an unshakable bond that
supersedes national identity, Umma. This  “global socioreligious  fraternity”  means  that  
religion will remain a main source of identity in the wake of globalization.44 According to
Malik, while Muslims may blend culturally into some Danish norms, they will never
blend structurally.45 Therefore Umma denies the possibility of full integration. However
Malik also predicts that in the wake of a growing multicultural agenda, umma will only
further  “pluralize  the  west.”46 However,  Malik’s  prediction  does  not  account  for  the  
influential power of right wing populism.
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Big power for small parties
American anthropologist and immigrant to Denmark, Jonathan Schwartz, has
said,  “In  America  there’s  one  politics  and  fifteen  ways  to  celebrate  Christmas.  In  
Denmark there are fifteen political parties and one way to celebrate Christmas.”47 In other
words, Danish politics are confusing, but the importance of its monoculture is
straightforward. Right wing populism is able to utilize this confusing Danish political
system to propagate Islamophobic rhetoric under the banner of protecting the coveted
Danish culture.
Before chronicling the rise of Danish right wing populism, it is important to
understand the landscape of Danish politics. The sheer number of political parties and
confusing  nature  of  their  names,  for  example,  the  “Liberal”  party  is  to  the  right  on  the  
political spectrum, which can make studying Danish politics from an American
perspective more difficult. Furthermore, it is important to understand the coalition
government system that characterizes much of Europe which is prime breeding ground
for small nationalistic parties. These parties can align themselves with larger parties to
gain governmental power. Denmark, like all Nordic countries, employs a system of
negative parliamentarism in which a government need only be tolerated by the majority
of Parliament, not supported.48 Therefore, Denmark has a history of small parties quickly
gaining support and power. For example, in 1973 the party representation doubled in
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Parliament from five to ten parties.49 Seven of these parties were right of the center
demonstrating the explosive power of small right wing parties.50 However these small
parties typically experience a very short life-span. The longevity of the DPP represents
the acute power of right wing populism.
Denmark has a long history of traditional populism, that is, the belief in the rights
of  the  common  people,  or  in  Denmark’s  case,  “the  folke.”51 While every Danish political
party,  like  most  Western  parties  throughout  the  world,  claims  to  be  speaking  for  “the  
people,”  the DPP makes this claim blatant in its name. Danish sociologist, Jens Rydgren,
has offered numerous explanations to explain the rise of right-wing populism in both
Denmark and more generally throughout the world.52 The following points come from
Rydgren’s  essay,  “Explaining  the  Emergence  of  Radical  Right-Wing Populist Parties:
The  Case  Denmark,”  which  are  the  most  pertinent  explanations  I  have  found  regarding  
the rise of right wing populism, followed by my own analysis:
1.  “The  emergence  of  niches  on  the  electoral  arena”:  In this case the niche is the fear of
large groups of Muslim foreigners.
2.  “Dealignment  and  realignment  processes”:  The realignment of the Progress Party,
which will be discussed briefly, helped make room for the DPP.
3.  “Politicization  of  new  issues”:  In Denmark, the politicized issue is Muslim immigrants
and  it  receives  ample  media  coverage  as  the  “Media”  chapter  will  demonstrate.  
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4.  “The  degree  of  convergence  in  the  political  space”:  A feeling among the Danish public
that politics were converging on economic and welfare policies helped make the shift
towards  “value  politics”  which  are  further  propagated  by  right-wing populism.
5.  “The  relative  openness  or  closure  of  the  institutionalized  political  systems”: Denmark
has one of the most open political systems in the world allowing for the growth of several
small parties.
6.  “Situations  in  which  the  established  parties  chose  to  collaborate  with  emerging  RRP  
parties  [Right  wing  populist  parties]  and  lend  legitimacy  to  these  parties”:  In hopes of
support, Premiership or media coverage many Danish political parties have made a
coalition  with  the  Danish  People’s  party.
7.  “Must  present  political  programs  – and, even more important, use a political rhetoric –
that  fit  the  available  niches”:  DPP members are well known for their rhetoric that has
both gotten them in trouble with the law and allowed for widespread support under the
guise of a charismatic leader.

The first Danish populist party, The Progress Party, stood on the platform of tax
reform.53 However, as immigration increased to the point where it has become a
perceived  threat,  the  Danish  People’s  Party  broke  away  from  the  Progress  Party  in  
1995.54 After their landslide victory in the 2001 election in support of the winning
Liberal-Conservative coalition, the DPP stood as the sole powerful populist party in
Denmark.55 Like most small, populist parties, the DPP rose under a single-issue
platform.56 In this case the issue was immigration and the Danish electorate was easily
persuaded. The historic 2001 election, which led to a ten year right wing hegemony, has
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been  described  as  the  triumph  of  the  DPP  and  the  “value  politics”  it  supports.57 In other
words, issues such as immigration, environmental protection and punishment for
criminals triumphed in  importance  over  issues  included  in  the  “economic  axis”  of  welfare  
state provision, wages or regulation.58 The DPP was able to gain nine seats in parliament,
12% of the total seats, due to its coalition with the Liberal Party.59 Propelled by the
September 11th attacks, which had occurred just two months prior, the DPP was now on
the forefront of Danish politics; a place it remains until today.
After the 2001 elections, the power of the DPP continued to rise. In 2005 and
2007 it held 13.3% and 13.8% of Parliament respectively.60 However, after the financial
turmoil of the 2008/09 economic and financial crisis, the electorate began to return to its
“economic  axis.”  The  DPP  therefore  lost  3  seats  and  now  holds  12.3%  of  Parliament.6162
While this paper will focus on policies during the Liberal-Conservative coalition
government from 2001 to 2011, their presence still influences the current political climate
run by the left wing party, the Social Democrats.
For a right wing populist party to remain powerful it needs a charismatic leader.63
In Denmark, voters have the option to vote for a candidate, usually a party leader, or a
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party. However, Danes have increasingly chosen to vote for a candidate demonstrating
the shift to a greater candidate orientated over party oriented political process.64 In the
case of the DPP, this charismatic leader is Pia Kjærsgaard, the patriotic founder of the
DPP.  Her  party’s  famous  tagline  “dit  land,  dit  valg,”  your  land,  your  choice,  resonates  
with a large portion of the Danish population.65 She is known for saying controversial,
attention-grabbing statements such as,  “If they [the Swedes] want to turn Stockholm
Gothenburg or Malmoe into a Scandinavian Beirut, with clan wars, honor killings and
gang rapes, let them do it. We can always put a barrier on the Oeresund Bridge.66”  Her  
2012 predecessor, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, is also known for similar statements. When
discussing the future of Denmark, he has stated that by 2050 there should be no Muslim
women with headscarves in Denmark.67 As the first powerful right wing populist leader
in  Scandinavia,  Kjærsgaard  has  been  a  “trendsetter”  for  similar  party  leaders  in  the  rest  of  
the Nordic region.68 This paper will now access whether or not this Islamophobic rhetoric
has seeped past the parliament and into policy implementation.
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CHAPTER 3: MEDIA

Questioning an egalitarian media
With a history of freedom of speech that spans back to the 18th century, Denmark
prides itself in its egalitarian media.69 However, a brief overview of Danish media will
exemplify a focused interest on the differences between Muslims and Danes rather than
an all-encompassing media that treats religions and ethnicities equally. The negative
portrayal of Islam in Danish media stems from the deeply engrained, politicized nature of
the topic. Furthermore, the media is intimately tied to both the existing government and
varying political parties. This means that the depiction of Islam in the media generally
follows political trends, including the Islamophobic rhetoric of the DPP.
The Danish Broadcasting Corporation, the oldest electronic media corporation in
Denmark,  is  a  publicly  run  institution  that  includes  DR,  Danmark’s  Radio,  and  the  
popular news channels on basic cable, DR TV 1 and TV2.70 It is financially supported by
government funding, advertisements and state-issued licensing fees.71 On the other hand,
print news media is privately owned, but as this section will demonstrate, historically tied
to a variety of political factions. Surprisingly, the largest segment of the Danish media
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industry is publishing.72 With this in mind, after a brief discussion of the portrayal of
Islam in electronic media outlets and its relationship to the government, this chapter will
focus largely on print news media. I will give special attention to the infamous
Muhammad cartoon crisis of 2005 which stemmed from a publication of cartoons in
Jyllands-Posten, one of the most widely read and influential newspaper in Denmark. I
will then briefly discuss the popularity of politicized fiction which has worked to
counteract  the  continuing  “othering”  of  Muslim  immigrants  in  the  news.  Lastly,  I  will  
conclude with a discussion of Danish media today and the future of the portrayal of
Muslims in Denmark.

The source of Islamophobia in media
Many scholars have argued that news biases stem from the political environment,
meaning that a negative portrayal of immigrants may be a temporary phenomenon that
changes with the political climate. Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Rune Stubager argue
that the Danish media in particular gives attention to issues that opposition parties want
politicized.73 Analyzing radio news from 1984-2004, their hypothesis is supported as
changes in government power alters the type of issues addressed by the media.74 For
example, from 1993-2001, when there was a left wing government, right wing issues
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such as the dangers of a wide-reaching welfare state and the infringement of immigrants
were the most prevalent in radio news.75 Their argument is further emphasized when one
considers that during the 2001 election, a game-changing election that put the right in
power after years of left-wing domination, 66% of TV news stories were about
immigrants.7677
On the other hand, Mustafa Hussain argues that Danish media runs on a “negative  
ethno-political consensus”  rather  than  as  a  product  of  oppositional  parties.78 Of 82
domestic news items about ethnic minorities, religious predicates were only used for two
religions, 42 times for Muslims, 3 times for Jews.79 Instead of being introduced by just
their name, names followed a reference to their religious faith, in most cases, a reference
to  Islam.  This  demonstrates  a  clear  “otherness”  attributed  to  Muslim  immigrants  and  their  
descendants in Danish media. Furthermore, in the time studied in 1997, 24 out of 27 news
items concerning crime were centered around Muslims80. Even more shockingly is his
uncovering of tabloids and advertisement using the phrase “Perker,”  which  is  a  
derogatory  term  to  describe  Arabs  similar  to  the  phrase  “nigger.”81 This data
demonstrates that there may be something beyond the oppositional political climate that
dictates media coverage in regards to Muslim immigrants.
75

Green-Pedersen and Stubager, 673.

76

Marsdal, 51.

77

Green-Pedersen and Stubager, 673.

78

Hussain,  Mustafa.  “Islam,  Media  and  Minorities  in  Denmark.” Current Sociology, 48:4 (2000): 98,
doi: 10.1177/0011392100048004008.
79

Hussain, 106.

80

Hussain, 105.

81

Hussain, 97.

29

The very controversial nature of Muslim immigration may lend weight to a more
permanent  Islamophobia  in  Danish  media.  The  “thrill  effect”  of  Muslims  in  the  media  is  
arguably irreversible with changes in public opinion. Hussain tests John  Zaller’s  Theory,  
that public opinion is affected by the immediate reaction to media rather than further
evaluation, through a series of interviews. The interviewees recognize discrimination, but
blame immigrants for their inability to assimilate. Furthermore, when asked about
immigration, the interviewees only responded by discussing Muslims despite several
other immigrant groups and despite the fact that Muslim immigrants stem from many
different cultures82. These responses represent the influence of media on Danish public
opinion  that  places  Muslims  in  a  clear  “us  versus  them”  paradigm.  
My prison survey garnered similar responses regarding the powerful influence of
news media on the Danish public.83 When the guards were asked if the news affected the
behavior  of  the  inmates  on  a  regular  basis,  70%  responded  “sometimes,”  while  16%  
responded  “often”  and  only  13%  responded  “never.”  These  responses  demonstrate the
ideological shaping power of the news media. Therefore, if the news media is regularly
broadcasting supposed cultural clashes between Muslim and Danish citizens, it can be
assumed that these polarizing sentiments will be absorbed, to some extent, by Danish
society as a whole.
In conclusion, negative portrayals of Muslim-Danish relations may be a
permanent staple of Danish media rather than a fluid issue dependent on an oppositional
right. This is best exemplified by the 2005/2006 Cartoon Crisis which occurred during a
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right-wing government with left-wing opposition. The crisis, which has been deemed the
worst catastrophe to hit Denmark since WWII, took over Danish media and plagues
Muslim-Danish relations to this day.

A  “Muhammad Crisis”  
In 2005 the media got hold of a new and captivating story. Writer and journalist,
Kåre  Bluitgen  was  unable  to  find  an  illustrator  for  his  children’s  book  on  the  story  of  the  
prophet Muhammad. Once he found an illustrator, he or she wished to remain anonymous
in fear of backlash from the Muslim community. The Danish media was hooked on the
story that pitted freedom of speech against Islamic beliefs. Flemming Rose, cultural
editor of the most popular Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, responded by asking
Danish  cartoonists  to  submit  cartoons  depicting  the  prophet  Muhammad  “as  they  see  
him.”  Many  cartoonists  ignored  the  request,  but  on  September  30,  2005,  12  Muhammad  
cartoons were published. The Danish Muslim community was outraged at what they saw
as an example of systemic negative portrayals of Islam in Danish media. On October 30,
2005 the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, refused to meet with 11
ambassadors hoping to discuss Islamophobia in Danish media. Members of the Danish
Muslim community then took their grievances to the international arena and rioting
ensued throughout the Arab world. By March 2006, the crisis had left a 139 people dead,
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over 800 injured and over 10,000 unemployed because of embargoes and destroyed
buildings.84
The majority of Danish journalism deems this crisis “Muhammed-krisen,”  the  
“Muhammad  crisis.”  This  emphasizes  an  issue  connected  to  Islam  rather  than  a  
“tegningskrisen,”  a  “cartoon  crisis,”  which  emphasizes  an  issue  with  the  actual  
publishing of the cartoons.85 In Flemming  Rose’s  article,  “Why  I  Published  Those  
Cartoons?,”  he  depicts  himself  as  a  defender  of  freedom  of  speech  in  the  wake  of  a  
destructive stream of political correctness. He begins with examples of self-censorship
responding to fears of Muslim backlashes. He then argues that by satirizing Islam, the
cartoons incorporate Muslims into Danish humor, and by extension, Danish culture.
Lastly,  he  blames  “radical  imams”  for  misinforming  rioters  in  the  Middle  East86. Many
scholars and most of the Danish media have taken this line of reasoning. Therefore, in the
eyes of most of the Danish population, the crisis demonstrates the incompatibility of
Islam with Western liberal ideals and the Danish imams are to blame for setting fire to
the conflict.

In December of 2005, a Danish imam supposedly went to the Middle East

with a 43 page folder of cartoons and drawings.87 Offensive cartoons, such as a depiction
of the prophet Muhammad as a pedophile, were added to stir unrest and initiate a
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response88.  The  true  effect  of  “imam  delegations”  during  this  time  period  is  highly  
debated and remains a mysterious part of the entire debacle. Some experts have
concluded that Danish imams did not spread false information, but simply displayed
drawings that were part of the hate material sent to Muslim organizations in the aftermath
of the 2005 cartoons.89 Either way, the governments of the Muslim world became
involved.
At first, distaste with the Danish government was merely symbolic. Iran passed a
law officially changing the name of Danish  pastries  to  “Prophet  Muhammad’s  Roses.”  
Palestinians made black-market  money  in  an  “attempt  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  local  
flag  burning  market.”90 However, in some countries, most likely to distract from their
own domestic turbulences, governments fueled violent reactions to the Danish cartoons.
The Syrian government has been blamed for sending out mass anonymous text messages
of falsities to fuel demonstrations against Denmark.91 Mohammed Yaqoob Qureshi, the
minister in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, offered mass sums of money for the death of
Danish cartoonists.92 Meanwhile, in Denmark, Danish Muslims were being blamed for
the international violence in what Lasse  Lindekilde  deems  the  “negative  boomerang  
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effect”  of  trans-national activity.93 The DPP used this opportunity to further isolate
Muslims from the Danish community.
At  the  height  of  the  crisis,  the  DPP  was  calling  Danish  Muslims  “traitors”  and  
actively campaigning for the removal of the citizenships of 4 Danish imams.94
Furthermore, many Danes were disappointed by the disapproving response of major
Western international actors such as the USA and the UK.95 However, this lack of
international support helped the DPP rise in popularity to a record high 17.8% support
rate, making it the third largest party in Denmark.96 Hundreds of news articles and more
than a dozen books were immediately written on the dangers of Islam. Most of these
writings stemmed from the Giordano Bruno and Free Speech Societies, right-wing
organizations that share the idea that the Western world in the midst of a culture war.97
The  media  response  to  the  crisis  just  furthered  exacerbated  the  “otherness”  attributed  to  
Muslims in Danish media.
In 2008, Peter Hervik conducted focus group interviews with Danes undergoing
higher education. Most of them described Muslims as irrational and dangerous people.
They also blamed Danish imams, Danish Muslims and Islam as a whole for the crisis.98
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This  common  rationale  fits  with  the  description  of  a  “Muhammad  Crisis;;”  a  crisis  of  
irreconcilable values between Islam and Denmark, or even more broadly, Islam and the
West.
My Prison survey serves as further evidence for the common Danish notion of a
“Muhammad  Crisis.”  Of  the  Prison  Guard  responses  regarding  changed  behavior  
following the cartoons, all responded by either discussing the increased radicalization
among Muslims or by blaming the Imams. In other words, if there was an issue following
the crisis, it was an issue foremost with Islam. The following are a sample of responses
that place blame  on  Muslim  inmates  for  “othering”  themselves  from  the  greater  ethnically  
Danish prison population:99
There was no change [following the cartoons], the clientele was just as
negative and standoffish etc. as was the case before the cartoons.
The religious aspect is very prominent. We see many [inmates] with Muslim
backgrounds who want to control according to their belief.
Hatred towards Christians.
Yes, there was a different mood among the Arab detainees. If we had a
difficult time communicating with them before then, it did not get any better.
More of them-and-us behavior. i.e. Muslims and non-Muslims. Prisoners who
previously  didn’t  care  about  the  religion, suddenly became extremely religious
and had to go to Friday Prayer and Christians were no longer allowed to use the
kitchen tools meant for everyone. Every time they were caught doing something
illegal (or against the  rules…)  they  excused  it  by  them being Muslims and that
they were being persecuted against.
The young non-assimilated Muslims stick together more and have become
rougher with the other inmates. They are more intolerant and might for instance
claim pots and pans in the kitchen in regards to whether or not they can be used to
99
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cook pork. They are very much on edge ready to fight and demand respect, which
one of course must first earn. I assume it is because they feel exposed and
insecure in their foundation. I have never experienced any racist behaviors from
Danes towards the Dark Danes.
All of these guard responses place blame on Muslim inmates. The most shocking
response  referred  to  the  Muslim  immigrants  as  the  “mørke  danskere,”  or  “Dark  Danes.”  
A term I have never heard used before, but serves as an example of the generalization of
Muslims in Danish society.
One of my most interesting research discoveries was that one of the men that were
blamed for spreading the crisis to the Middle East was a Prison Imam at my research
center, Nyborg Prison. Some guards also blamed the Imam as the following response
demonstrates:
Oddly enough it didn’t  seem  as  though  any  of  the inmates changed behavior, nor
that anything was happening in secret that the staff were not supposed to know
about. Most noteworthy was the fact that the Prison Imam (who was hired by the
prison and therefore a state employee at the time) had the audacity to travel with a
group to the Middle East and talk about Denmark in a very negative way.
Therefore he was both directly and indirectly partly responsible for the entire
Muhammad case blowing out of proportion as it did.

On one of my first days of research I visited the deserted Nyborg Prison mosque. No
Imam has been rehired since the firing of Mohamad Al-Khaled Samha, the Prison Imam
who, according to a few discussions with a number of inmates and guards, supposedly
“riled  up”  Muslim  inmates  and  participated  in  the  public  defamation  of  Denmark  while  
traveling in the Middle East.100 Without a religious leader on the Prison grounds, not a
single Muslim entered the prayer room during my two month stay. These survey
100
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responses and observations demonstrate the Danish propensity to depict the cartoons as a
“Muhammad  Crisis.”  

A  “Cartoon  Crisis”
International migration and ethnic relations specialist, Peter Hervick, argues that
the crisis is an example of Islamophobia within the Danish media that spans decades.
Hervick, like a small portion of the Danish population and a growing base of scholars,
argues  that  the  cartoons  were  in  fact  a  “cartoon  crisis”  rather  than  a  “Muhammad  crisis”  
between  two  conflicting  cultures  that  pit  an  “enlightened”  view  of  media  against  a  
“barbaric”  religious  view.    The  “cartoon  crisis”  argument  stems  from  years  of  right-wing
populist rhetoric against immigrants in Danish media and a history of newspaper-political
party affiliations.
Hervick describes the sensationalist nature of Islam in the news media as a
consequence  of  “re-politicization”  to  compete  in  a  rapidly  expanding  market.101 For
example, to compete with free dailies, which at one point held 60% of the print news
market, larger newspapers used the values and opinions of the extreme right to
compete.102 In 1997, Ekstra Bladet and B.T., the most popular tabloid papers in Denmark,
began a string of opinion pieces highly critical of immigration and Islam which Hervick
connects to the rise of the DPP.103 These pieces were reinforced by the larger and more
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respected Jyllands-Posten. During Ekstra  Bladet’s  campaign,  “The  Foreigners”,  JyllandsPosten published a highly politicized story about a ten-year-old Danish Muslim boy
named Amin.104 Amin, who was expelled from school for refusing to bathe with his peers
before swimming, began as a story defending the boy against perceived racism. However,
after a number of Jyllands-Posten’s  letters to the editor, it quickly transformed to a
culture war, with Amin being on the wrong side of the battle.105
Another  example  Hervick  stresses  is  the  “Mona  Sheikh  story”  of  2001.  Three  
Danish Muslims, Mona Sheikh, Tanwir Ahmed and Babar Baig, ran for political office in
the Radical Left. However, they were attacked by a number of news sources as supporters
of terrorist organizations and party officials quickly distanced themselves from the three
men.106 Jyllands-Posten published more anti-Islamic articles than any other Danish
newspaper during this time and was the only news source that did not retract their
statements after the Danish Press Council ruled that the connection to terrorism was
completely unfounded.107 With these examples in mind, a long-lasting campaign against
Muslim immigrants in the Danish media seems like a likely explanation  for  the  “Cartoon  
Crisis”  of  2005/06.  
Furthermore,  a  “Muhammad  Crisis”  insinuates  that  Christians  in  Denmark  differ  
from Muslims because they allow the satirization of their own religion. However, The
Guardian was contacted by a Danish cartoonist in 2006 to leak a story in which JyllandsPosten refused to publish his cartoons with Jesus on the basis that they would be too
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offensive. Jyllands-Posten responded by stating "in the Muhammad drawings case, we
asked the illustrators to do it. I did not ask for these [the Jesus] cartoons. That's the
difference.”108 This demonstrates a clear case of provocation in regards to Danish
Muslims. Jytte Klausen, a Danish Political professor, describes the intention of JyllandsPosten’s  cartoons  most  clearly  by  stating,  “They are the pebble that started a tsunami -but  they  were  never  meant  to  be  innocent.”109
Four of the twelve cartoonists who drew the Muhammad cartoons were directly
employed or previously employed by Jyllands-Posten. Those four cartoons are the most
controversial of the group.110 For  example,  the  most  infamous  cartoon,  “Muhammad  with  
a  bomb  turban,”  was  drawn  by  Jyllands-Posten employee, Kurt Westergaard. It is
especially offensive because it contains the Islamic testimony of faith on the bomb which
insinuates Islam in its entirety is a violent faith.111 The cartoonists who were independent
from Jyllands-Posten illustrated more ironic and less aggressive cartoons. Most notably,
one cartoonist depicted Muhammad as a child writing on a blackboard "Jyllands-Posten's
journalists  are  a  bunch  of  reactionary  provocateurs,”  demonstrating  that  not  every  
participant  condoned  the  “freedom  of  speech”  premise  behind  the  cartoons.112 The
difference in the cartoons drawn by Jyllands-Posten employees and those less offensive
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ones drawn by independent artists suggests that Jyllands-Posten, like many other Danish
media sources, is more incentivized by Islamophobic political discourse than an actual
battle for freedom of speech.
As Jyllands-Posten’s  cartoons  are  put  in  the  context  of the larger history of
Danish  media’s  sensationalization  of  Islam,  the  crisis  is  more  clearly  unveiled  as  a  
“Cartoon  Crisis.”  “Cartoon  Crisis”  insinuates an issue with Danish media rather than an
issue between two competing cultures. In fact, the Muslim ambassadors who called for a
meeting with the Prime Minister had a long list of grievances in addition to the cartoons
that were perceived as slander against Islam.113 Considering their list of media slander,
one questions the decision of the government to refuse the meeting with the Muslim
ambassadors and, more importantly, the connection between the media and the Danish
government. Instead of meeting with the 11 Muslim ambassadors, on October 30, 2005,
Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen gave an interview with Jyllands-Posten stating
“Freedom  of  speech  must  be  used  for  provocation.114”  This  drastic  move  sheds  light  on  a  
criticism that more left-wing papers have attributed to Jyllands-Posten for years: that it,
like several other media sources, work together with right-wing parties.115
Firstly, freedom of speech is the very thing that allows Fogh Rasmussen, who was
also Minister of the Press, to criticize the cartoons.116 However, instead of distancing the
government from the newspaper or condemning the views behind the cartoons, he
brought his government closer to Jyllands-Posten. Furthermore, the ambassadors were
113
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not asking the Prime Minister to remove the cartoons, which would be a legal violation of
freedom of speech, but rather to discuss the portrayal of Islam in Denmark and discuss
the steps necessary for inter-faith dialogue117. Their complaints, as stated earlier, were not
against the cartoons alone. They had a long list of grievances that included a neo-nazi
radio station and some public remarks from DPP members which  Fogh  Rasmussen’s  
government had previously condemned.118 The refusal to distance themselves from
Jyllands-Posten demonstrates a deeper connection between certain media outlets and
political parties.
In an internal survey made by Jyllands-Posten in 2004, 81% of employees
answered  “yes”  to  the  question,  “Do  you  feel  that  Jyllands-Posten has become more right
wing  in  its  way  of  prioritizing  journalistic  stories?”119 Therefore, it may not come as a
surprise that Jyllands-Posten supported the premiership of Fogh Rasmussen, the leader of
the right wing Liberal Party. Anders Fogh Rasmussen launched his political strategy,
“kulturkamp,”  or  “culture  war,”  which  was  quickly  joined  by  Jyllands-Posten in the
summer of 2003 with their “culture  war”  strategy  that  would focus on the maintenance of
Danish culture.120 In 2004, they hired their Moscow correspondent, Flemming Rose, as
the cultural editor to spearhead this strategy.121 His  call  to  depict  Muhammad  “as  you  see  
him”  is  a  clear  offshoot  of  a  larger  right-wing political strategy.
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Jytte  Klausen  suggests  that  the  governmental  response  to  the  “cartoon  crisis”  may  
be  a  direct  result  of  DPP  influence.  The  success  of  Fogh  Andersen’s  Liberal  Party  
depended on the support of the DPP, without which they could not hold on to the
premiership. Therefore, Pia Kjaergaard may have threatened to withdraw support of the
DPP if Fogh Rasmussen did not take a stand affirming Jyllands-Posten.122 The DPP uses
freedom of speech as a central platform and actively campaigns to get the blasphemy law
taken out of the Danish constitution. In fact, many DPP members have a personal stake
in this campaign in order to avoid legal problems with their own speeches. For example,
in 2006, DPP members, Jesper Langballe and Soren Krarup, described Muslims as "a
cancer on Danish society" in Parliament which leads to them being threatened with the
blasphemy law.123 Another explanation is that Fogh Rasmussen genuinely believes that
Denmark is in the midst of a culture clash and that the media is at the forefront of the
battle.124 Either way, by responding to the crisis with an interview in Jyllands-Posten,
Fogh Rasmussen and his government seemed in full support of the cartoons.
While the tabloid papers, Ekstra Bladet and B.T, were the strongest supporters of
both Jyllands-Posten and the government during the cartoon crisis, Fogh Rasmussen set a
political precedent for many other media outlets.125 On February 17, 2008, following the
uncovering of a murder plot against one of the cartoonists, seventeen Danish newspapers,
even those with a political history connected to the left wing, republished the twelve
cartoons  as  a  statement  of  “freedom  of  expression”  and  in  solidarity  with  Jyllands122

Jytte Klausen, The Cartoons That Shook the World, (Orwigsburg: Yale University Press, 2009), 149.

123

Klausen,  “Cartoon  Jihad:  Rotten  Jurdgement  in  the  State  of  Denmark.”

124

Klausen, The Cartoons That Shook the World, 162.

125

Hervick, 20.

42

Posten’s  cartoonist.126 Despite even more media support for the Muhammad cartoons,
this publishing did not cause an international uproar.
Hervick argues that the crisis could have been avoided if the government
distanced themselves from the Danish media rather than showing solidarity with the
cartoons. Without being able to engage in dialogue in their own country, it can be argued
that it is only natural for Muslims to turn to their home-government or to network with
Muslim organizations for support and consultation.127 Sweden had their own Muslim
cartoon debacle in 2007, but the government quickly distanced themselves from the
newspaper and used the experience as an opportunity for inter-faith dialogue.128
Consequently, the Swedish crisis did not cause international outrage. With this logic, it
was the link between the Danish government and Jyllands-Posten that led to the mass
outrage.
Since the Danish Cartoon Crisis, the Danish government has learned to respond in
a  manner  similar  to  the  Swedish  government’s  response.  In  October  2006  the  free  daily,  
Nyhedsavisen, published images from a Danish  People’s  Party’s  youth  organization  
which held a competition to see who could draw the most vulgar prophet Muhammad.
The government immediately invited Muslim ambassadors to Denmark to apologize for
and discuss the cartoons which distanced the government from the drawings.129
Similarly, the 2008 mass republication of the Muhammad cartoons was handled by inter126
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faith and inter-cultural dialogue and without a government presence behind the cartoons.
Consequently, there was no transnational action from Danish Muslims and a crisis was
easily avoided.130

Politicized fiction: a small critique of the right
As the crisis subsided, so has data about Muslims in Danish media. We know that
there has been a learning process since the publishing of the 2005 cartoons, but are
Muslims given a fairer portrayal in the current Danish media? This is a hard question to
answer without further data collection. However, what can be deduced from current
analysis is that Muslim integration into Danish society is still a highly politicized and
popular topic in Danish media through both positive and negative responses to the
continuing presence of right-wing populist rhetoric. In fact, it has been widely discussed
by scholars that Denmark is now in an era of politicized fiction.131 From popular novels
focusing on the lives of Danish politicians, to a large number of controversial Danish
films,  the  assimilation  of  Muslims  and  the  meaning  of  “Danishness”  is  highly  debated  in  
the arena of fiction.
A popular 2007 film, AFR, uses a mocumentary style to satirize the premiership
of  Anders  Fogh  Rasmussen  and  criticize  the  Danish  People’s  Party.  The  concept  of  
“freedom  of  speech”  is  tested  by  calling  Fogh  Rasmussen  gay  and  by  using  out-of-
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context  quotes  from  the  Danish  People’s  Party’s  leader,  Pia Kjærsgaard, are used to
emphasize  the  “otherness”  attributed  to  this  stigma.  By  the  film’s  conclusion,  it  is  
insinuated  that  Fogh  Rasmussen  was  murdered  by  members  of  the  Danish  People’s  
Party.132 Similarly, The T.V. show, Borgen, whose title refers to the parliamentary
building, Christianborg, uses fictionalized Danish politics to discuss and satirize the
Danish  People’s  Party.  Borgen has a popular following that has surpassed Danish media
and spread to America. The show follows a female Prime Minister, who after her
premiership, becomes so upset with the growth of right-wing populist rhetoric in other
parties, that she begins her own political party.133 These examples are just some of many
that represent a Danish fascination with politicized fiction. It also demonstrates that after
the  “cartoon  crisis,”  many  Danish  media  outlets  recognize  the  spread  of  right-wing
populism as an instigator for Danish discrimination against their Muslim population.
However, criticism of right wing populist influence in Danish politics are not seen
or heard in everyday media outlets. The inability to assimilate Muslims in Danish society
is still a popular headline that guarantees mass viewership. Many arguments made in
Mustafa  Hussain’s  aforementioned  2006,  article  still  hold true. Muslims are still
portrayed  in  an  “us  versus  them”  paradigm.  
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Muslim victims over Danish Muslims
The only positive news coverage of Muslim immigrants seems to place Muslim
women  and  children  as  “victims.”  A  quick  search  through  a  number  of  Danish
newspapers  shows  heavy  coverage  of  the  “unjustness”  of  Islam  on  weaker  members  of  
society. This is best exemplified by one of the few Muslims to receive positive Danish
media attention, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali- American activist who fights against Islamic
practices  that  harm  women.  In  2010,  she  received  the  “Freedom  of  Expression  Award”  
from Jyllands-Posten and  gave  a  widely  covered  speech  at  the  Danish  People’s  Party  
Convention.134135
In  the  news,  human  interest  stories  also  play  this  “victim  card”  when  discussing
Muslims to capture a large audience on established news channels. In the fall of 2013,
“Stor  A:  fra  bandekrig  til  jihad,”  translated  to  “Big  A:  from  gang  to  jihad,”  was  a  two  
part, story on the public news channel, DR 2, that followed a former gang member into
the brutal fighting against the Assad regime in Syria. The news story portrayed the plight
of  the  Syrians  and  the  “jihad”  rebels  as  hopeless.136 In March 2009, Iraqi asylum seekers
were arrested and, in some cases, repatriated to their home country after hiding out in a
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Danish church.137 The media coverage for this event was so intense that it developed into
a conflict with radical left-wing groups confronting the police in the streets. While
Muslims  are  widely  viewed  as  “victims”  in  the  Danish  media, they are rarely referred to
as  “Danish.”
One of the only Danish Muslims I was able to find in Danish media was Yahya
Hassan. Yahya is known for his widely viewed YouTube videos in which he reads his
poetry describing life as a Danish Muslim. His poems are delivered intentionally in
broken Danish with a heavy Arab accent, satirizing his fellow Danish Muslims. The
following is an excerpt (because of foul language, a very short excerpt) from his poem,
“Langdigt,”  or  “Long  Poem”
Me,  I’m  telling  a  truth, what are you saying about your God with the smell of
weed  in  your  mouth?  You,  you’re  a  Muslim.  You,  you  don’t  know   whether you
want Halal or Haram. You, you know that you want Haram,  but  you’re  pretending  
to want  Halal.  You,  you  don’t  want  pork,  may  Allah praise your eating habits.
You, you want Friday prayer until the next Friday prayer. You, you want
Ramadan until the next Ramadan. And in between the Friday prayers and the
Ramadan, you, you want a knife in your pocket. You, you want to bump in to
people  and  ask  them  if  they’ve  got  a  problem,  even  though  the only problem is
you.138

It is clear that Yahya takes the view of many right-wing populist Danes and of much of
the Danish media; that Muslims in Denmark fail at assimilating because of their own
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wrongdoings. This opinion has gotten him a fair amount of media attention culminating
with an upcoming weekly column in the newspaper Politiken.139
Similarly, Basim, who recently won the Danish representative spot in the
upcoming 2014 Eurovision singing contest, emphasizes his Danish integration. The first
Danish Muslim participant has repeatedly stated that he was taught to stand firmly by his
“Danishness”  and  the  power  of  integration.140 The talented, Arab-Danish singer was
voted by viewers at the Dansk Melodi Grand Prix after his patriotic performance of
“Cliche  Love  Song.”  His  performance  was  the  only  one  that  donned  a  large  Danish  flag  
and  a  prideful  “Danmark!”  exclamation  between  breathless  verses.141 His patriotic show
emphasized his integration and led to the support of his Danish viewers.
In Danish media today, it seems that Muslims are either being portrayed as
victims of their own religion or as either successes or failures at assimilation. Either way,
they  are  told  that  “the  problem  is  you.”
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The future of Danish media
The  2006  cartoon  crisis  became  a  “crisis”  because  of  a  poor  governmental  
response. The media and the Danish political right wing have a history of cooperation in
regards  to  pressing  “value  politics,”  or  politics  focusing  on  the  issues  of  immigration and
perceived culture clashes. However, in the aftermath of the crisis, Danish fiction has been
increasingly politicized and critical of the right wing influence on Danish public opinion.
However, the victims of Islam and assimilation arguments like that of Yahya Hassan will
continue to permeate the Danish media.
Danish anchors and interviewees are infamous for their unchallenging stance with
their interview guests142. In other words, politicians with a right-wing populist agenda can
say almost anything on the news without being challenged; it makes for good television.
The  Danish  People’s  Party  and  their  ally,  the  Liberal  Alliance  are  still  fighting  for  the  
removal of the blasphemy section of the Danish constitution so they can continue to
exercise  this  “freedom  of  speech”  in  Danish  media.143 The Blasphemy Act protects all
religions from defamation, but has not resulted in an actual conviction since 1938.144 The
fact that the DPP is actively campaigning for its removal demonstrates their intentions to
drive Denmark towards their right wing populist agenda through the media. The public
and  political  responses  to  the  misleadingly  titled,  “Muhammad  Crisis,”  and  the  direction  
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of Danish entertainment and news media shows that, in the case of the media, Danish
policies  are  intentionally  “othering” Muslim immigrants and their descendants.
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CHAPTER 3: SOCIAL SERVICES

The welfare state enters the private home
Denmark’s  welfare  system  has  long  functioned  as  a  powerful  force  in  everyday  
Danish society. However, the tax funded system penetrates into the depths of the private
sphere. Given the anti-immigration sentiments of right wing populism, comes a disdain,
albeit a limited one in the American sense, for this power of the welfare state. To
continue my focus on the superimposed struggles of Muslim integration in Denmark, I
will discuss the welfare laws that specifically affect Muslims immigrants and their
descendants. Since welfare touches many aspects of societal infrastructure, from
education to housing, it plays a powerful and interesting role in the process of integration.
Karen Fog Olwig sums up integration in the Scandinavian welfare state by stating that it
has  become  a  “...term  denoting  the  ability  to  conform  to  social  norms  and  cultural values
defined  in  dominant  discourse  as  basic  to  proper  citizenship…designating  who  belongsand by implication who does not belong-in  society.”145 Since the wide reaching branches
of the welfare state, as Olwig aptly summarized, have the power to dictate  society’s  
norms, it has a particularly important role in regards to the integration of Muslims in
Denmark.
This is not a complete review of the Danish welfare system, an entirely new
research topic in itself, but rather an overview of a few issues that directly effect Danish
immigrants and have are supported by research: The social benefits available to refugees,
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the welfare objections to trans-national marriages, and changes in educational services.
Hopefully this review can be used as both a jumping off point into further research and,
most importantly, paint a more detailed picture of Danish Muslim life in the wake of a
lasting right wing populist influence.

The DPP: bridging welfare and immigration
The DPP rose to prominence through its anti-taxation rhetoric, but gained power
through its anti-immigration stance.146 In the eyes of many Danes, the two platforms are
intimately connected. A relatively high unemployment rate in Denmark caused public
concern over immigration to spike drastically from 4% in 1989 to 25% in 1998.147 The
DPP was able to capitalize on this fear that immigration was the cause of economic
disruption. Increased unemployment is a tool that the DPP uses to oust a system that, they
argue, drains citizens of resources as foreigners monopolize any positive effects of the
high taxation. Furthermore, studies have proven that there are no positive net transfers to
the state from immigrants of non-western countries.148 However, this evidence does not
necessarily support the demise of the welfare state. In the latest documented financial
quarter, only about 15.6% of Danes receiving public benefits were born outside of
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Denmark. Meaning, 84.4% of Danes receiving public benefits are, in fact, born in
Denmark.149 In other words, the welfare state is still widely utilized by ethnic Danes.
Using the 2002/2003 European Social Survey, Claudia Senik, Holger Stichnoth
and Karine Van der Straeten analyze the connection between immigration and the
opinions on the welfare state of European citizens of their country’s  ethnic  origin.    They  
conclude  that  immigration  does  not  necessarily  reduce  native  citizens’  support  for  the  
welfare  state  unless  they  have  a  “pure  dislike”  of  immigrants  and/or  they  are  concerned  
about the economic consequences of immigration. When both sentiments are felt, as in
the case of the DPP, they will react much more negatively towards the welfare state.150
However, being anti-immigration is not a precursory stance to being anti-welfare state. In
fact,  those  who  felt  neither  a  “pure  dislike”  of immigrants nor concern for the economic
consequences of immigration were more inclined to be anti-welfare state independently
of immigrants.151 The fact that the DPP has brought immigration and the welfare state
together as intrinsically connected issues reflects a greater xenophobic attitude.

The refugee meets the welfare state
In the previous chapter I briefly discussed the 1997 Ekstra Bladet article series,
“The  Foreigners”  as  one  of  many  examples  of  the  media  defamation  of  Muslim  
immigrants and their descendants. The article series explored specific immigrant cases of
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abuse  of  the  ‘generous’  Danish  welfare  system.  The  series  was  so  widely  read  it  spurred  a  
reality TV show about a Somali man with two wives and eleven children.152 Somalis, one
of the latest refugee groups to enter Denmark, were already under fire for their stark
cultural differences and their high crime rate. The series, sponsored by government
funding, caused such a public outcry that the right quickly campaigned against welfare
benefits for refugees. The campaign, demonstrating the powerful influence of the media,
was successful.153 By 1999, under the pressure of the mounting political clout of their
ideological competitor, the DPP, the Social Democrats introduced the first refugee
integration  law,  the  “Spatial  Dispersal  Policy.”
According  to  Olwig,  it  is  the  fear  of  “parallel  societies,”  or  small  ethnic  
communities,  that  spur  the  supposedly  “integrationist”  welfare  policies  of  the  Danish  
government.154 While integration and assimilation may be the tag lines of Danish welfare
policies towards refugees, the goal tends to favor the development and perpetuation of the
welfare system, rather than the needs of the displaced families.155 The  “Spatial  Dispersal  
Policy”  is  the  ultimate  example  of  this bias. Birgitte Romme Larsen discusses the policy
by building off the argument of political scientist, Peter Nannestad. Nannestad theorizes
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that the social connections from intra-group bonding are what immigrants may need to
mediate social relations with the society of their greater host country.156
Refugees are required to live in local, often extremely small, Danish communities
for three years. During these years they must take language and culture classes with the
financial  aid  of  “introduktionsydelse,”  or introductory benefits.157 While the stated
purpose is geographical distribution to avoid marginalized ghettos, Larsen argues that the
political  motivation  is  still  obvious:  to  turn  refugees  into  “good  members  of  mainstream  
Danish  society.”158 Choosing a home is  delving  into  the  deepest  aspects  of  people’s  lives.  
It  means  choosing  their  children’s  daycare,  dictating  their  social  networks  and,  most  
contradictory, limiting their employment opportunities.159 These issues were only
exacerbated in 2001, when Fogh Rasmussen’s  Conservative  Liberal  government  reduced  
the “introduktionsydelse” to  60%  of  ordinary  public  welfare  benefits  to  “motivate  them  to  
work.”160
Larsen  interviews  several  refugee  families  who  were  “spatially  dispersed”  
throughout Denmark. Those who were able to drive to nearby family or similar ethnic
groups had a much easier time assimilating into Danish society. They were able to learn
the Danish cultural quirks from groups they trusted which allowed them to later connect
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with the ethnic Danes in their own towns.161 Larsen discusses in depth the plight of one
Sudanese refugee family who struggled in a small Danish town without any connections
to other immigrants of their background. Danish child services were heavily involved in
their case because the parents did not understand Danish grocery stores and were sending
their  children  to  school  with  “unhealthy”  lunches.  They  did  not  trust  the  authorities  and  
had  no  ‘mediators’  with  established  roots  of  trust  to  explain  that  the  typical  Danish  bread  
“rugbrod” is expected for lunches. The constant involvement of child services made the
parents feel undermined and hopeless. Meanwhile, they were increasingly ostracized
from their local community. They expressed their wishes to leave Denmark once they
built up the means.162 In other words, their negative experience from spatial dispersal will
cause them to leave before they have the opportunity to ever give back to the economy of
the welfare state that has thus far funded them.
The importance of a mediating group of the same ethnicity is further evidenced by
my research at Nyborg Prison. Of the 76 guards interviewed, a startling 100% answered
that the prisoners divided themselves into groups along ethnic lines. Several other
categories were mentioned as well, including, but not limited to, religion, age and type of
crime. However, ethnicity was a group category that was always seen.163 While the prison
is supposed to be viewed as a microcosm for Danish society, this may be an observation
closer to the human condition as a whole. It demonstrates the naturalness of forming
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connections between individuals of a similar ethnicity. These natural connections may
bring the inmates closer to the wider prison community.
An ethnic community can serve as a bridge to the culturally homogenous welfare
state. However, Danish bureaucratic policies serve to isolate rather than assimilate
refugees  into  Danish  society.  While  the  welfare  policies  for  ‘spatially  dispersed’  refugees  
has undergone influence from right wing populist rhetoric, it is not as intentionally
Islamophobic  as  the  Danish  state’s  involvement  in  transnational  marriage.  

The Danish state on marriage
Transnational  marriage  has  been  incorporated  into  the  discussion  of  ‘Danishness,’  
making Denmark the self-proclaimed  ‘hardliner’  on  ethnic  minority  marriages.164 The
dialogue of the Liberal-Conservative government between 2001 and 2011 can be
understood  as  “an  experiment  in  subjugating  family  reunification  rights  to  the  greater  
goal of sustaining the welfare state.165”  Despite  being a signatory to the European
Convention  on  Human  Rights  over  60  years  ago,  the  citizen’s  right  to  a  private  family  life  
has been overlooked for the greater interests of the nation.166 In fact, the Migrant Policy
Index attributes Denmark a low score of 37 out of 100 in regards to family reunification.
This is particularly startling when compared to its Scandinavian counterparts whose
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scores range from 68 to 84. Concern for the Danish welfare state has altered the freedom
of marriage, with a particular effect on Muslim immigrants and their descendants.
In his research paper on Pakistani immigrants in Denmark, Garbi Schmidt
uncovers the individual significance of transnational marriage. In addition to marriage
serving as an investment in maintaining culture, the Pakistani interviewees argued that
their marriage choices were part of individual priorities and free will, a staple of Danish
society.167 However, the mounting laws restricting their freedom to choose a spouse seem
to be directly aimed at Muslim immigrants. For example, while it is legal to marry ones
cousin in Denmark, the cousin cannot be from a country other than Denmark.168 Laws
like  this  stem  from  a  “moral  panic,’  largely  spurred  by  the  Danish  media  and  the  loud  
rhetoric of the right wing populists, to  ‘save’  Muslim  women  from  arranged  marriages  
and abusive relationships.169 The laws are also explained by law makers as modes of post
9/11  securitization  and  as  part  of  Fogh  Rasmussen’s  integration  plan,  “kulturkamp.”170
The goal is greater compliance with Danish civic expectations, most notably, that women
will stand ready to work, pay taxes and participate in Danish institutions.171 The most
intrusive and interesting law for the purposes of this research is the law of national
attachment that, according to Schmidt,  has  “established  a  hierarchy  between  citizens  in  
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which,  based  on  an  assumption  of  ‘true’  belonging,  some  have  certain  rights  that  others  
do not.”172
The National Attachment law was introduced in 2000 in regards to family
reunification for foreigners living in Denmark. In 2002 it was applied to Danish citizens
who married foreigners. Both of the individuals getting married must have a total national
attachment greater to Denmark than any other country.173 The parameters of national
attachment change often, but have included parameters like how well they speak Danish,
how long they have lived in Denmark and whether either partner have any children or
family members in another country.174 Furthermore, both partners must be over 24, the
Danish resident should be able to deposit 50,000DK to caution against support payments
from public welfare and the Danish resident must not have received social support in the
previous year, a difficult feat in a welfare state.175 These laws had quick and effective
results. From 2001 to 2009 the percentage of first and second generation immigrants from
non-western countries that wed people from another country decreased from 61.1% to
24.9%.176
The bias against immigrants from the Middle East is best exemplified by Søren
Pind, the Minister of Integration in 2010, who suggested in Parliament that people from
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea should be exempt from
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citizen and national attachment tests.177 Since the election of the new Left wing Social
Democrat government in 2011, a few of the most restrictive measures of National
Attachment  have  been  repealed.  However,  “the  paradigm  of  the  competition  welfare  state  
still  stands”  and  spousal  reunification  remains  standing  as  an  issue  of  “Danishness.” 178
The National Attachment law is still widely supported and the new government does not
want to isolate voters who have widely shifted to the right on immigration issues.179
Without being able to choose their own spouse, many immigrants end up moving to
Sweden to marry, taking with them their economic contributions from the Danish welfare
system.180

The Danish state on education
One of the most important aspects of a welfare state is its educational system. The
Danish educational system boasts high international rating and progressive policies.181
While the notion of multiculturalism has been shunned in most sectors of Danish society,
the Danish education system has recognized the importance of differentiating teaching
methodology for immigrants who may require some special attention. The Folkeskole
Act of 1993 set an obligation to differentiate teaching for different types of students, a
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milestone requirement in a very decentralized system.182 However, the OECD still
reported unsatisfactory academic performance for Danish bilingual children. In fact, a
2004 report on OECD progress stated that almost 50% of bilingual children who leave
Danish primary education are without functional reading skills.183 The Ministry of
Education has worked quickly to remedy this educational gap with more centralized
evaluations. While the Ministry of Education is confident in the educational reforms
Denmark has made, it acknowledges the issues of implementation in the very
decentralized Danish education system.184 However, I contend that there may be
something that goes beyond decentralization that hinders these reforms, most notably, the
highly politicized nature of Muslim immigrants from right wing populist rhetoric.
The majority of bilingual children undergoing Danish education are descendants
of parents from Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Somalia.185 Meaning, the majority of these
bilingual students who need specialized educational attention are Muslim. In the wake of
a powerful right wing populist influence, Muslim families are increasingly perceived as a
hindrance to the Danish school system. For example, Danes often hold the opinion that
Muslim  parents  “push”  their  children  rather  than  allowing  them  the  freedom to choose
their own paths, a highly valued component of Danish education.186 In Denmark, all
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stages of education are paid for by the public sphere and living stipends are offered by the
government so that every student can follow a path that best suits him or her.
Furthermore,  ‘play’  is  considered  one  of  the  most  developmentally  important  aspects  of
childhood.187 In addition to allowing children to play at school, parents are expected to
allow  their  children  similar  freedoms  at  home.  This  focus  on  ‘play’  and  freedom  can  lead  
to the first of many cultural misunderstandings.
Mikkel Rytter explores this  value  clash  in  his  article,  “Money  or  Education?  
Improvement  Strategies  Among  Pakistani  Families  in  Denmark.”  Rytter  studies  the  
immense improvement in the educational achievements of the descendants of Pakistani
immigrants. Rather than their goals being dictated by a societal pressure for success,
Pakistani  families  set  their  own  ideals  for  achievement.  These  goals  “from  below”  reflect  
the  family’s  collective  honor  among  their  immigrant  community.188 The prestige of being
a taxi driver or a shop owner have diminished and immigrant parents expect their
children to become doctors, engineers or lawyers. Pakistani parents see their unskilled
labor  as  a  road  towards  their  children’s  higher  education  making  education  a  “family  
project.”189 This parental pressure clashes with Danish culture and reflects a greater issue
in Danish education: a lack of communication between the school system and immigrant
parents.
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In Denmark, parents are expected to be highly involved at every level of their
children’s  education.190 The NGO, Humanity in Action, has explored the disconnect
between Danish educators and immigrant parents through a series of interviews. These
interviews revealed that parental pressure is not the only cultural issue that comes into
play. Danish culture places a lot of emphasis on birthdays, Christmas and most
controversially, the staple food of pork, a food that is forbidden in Islam. Consequently,
cultural misunderstandings are rampant in the Danish classroom. The situation is only
exacerbated by the fact that linguistic barriers often keep immigrant parents ostracized
from  their  children’s  education.  Parents  also  may  choose  to  be  uninvolved  because  they  
feel unwanted and misunderstood by other parents and teachers.191
As a result, a number of immigrant parents have chosen to send their children to
private schools rather than to public schools that they feel culturally ostracizes them. The
public school tradition in Denmark runs on a norm of decentralization in which parents
have nearly complete control over their  children’s  education.192 The probability that a
student will go to private school increases by age and usually offers some special
religious or linguistic focus.193 While they are established by the parents, they are mostly

190

Harry  Daniels.  “Parents  and  schooling in the European Union: a case study from Denmark and
Germany”  In  Equality and Diversity in Education: National and International Contexts, ed. Patricia Potts,
et al. (London: Routledge, 1995), 104.
191

Simon Rosof and Lise Tjerrild,  “Acknowledging  a  Multi-Cultural Denmark: Bringing Balance to the
Folkeskoler,”  Humanity in Action, 2000, http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/23acknowledging-a-multi-cultural-denmark-bringing-balance-to-the-folkeskoler.
192

Lejf Moos, Klaus Kasper Kofod, Katrin  Hjort,  and  Peter  Henrik  Raae,  “Denmark:  New  Links  Between  
Education  and  Economics”  in  Transnational Influences on Values and Practices in Nordic Educational
Leadership, ed. Lejf Moos (New York: Springer, 2013), 19.
193

Pia Skott and Klaus Kasper Kofod,  “Independent Schools in Different Nordic Contexts: Implications
for School Leadership?”  in  Transnational Influences on Values and Practices in Nordic Educational
Leadership (New York: Springer, 2013), 106.

63

funded by tax money or governmental subsidies, making them an affordable option.194 A
number of municipality changes in 2007 that caused many smaller public schools to shut
down have directly influenced a spike in private schools throughout Denmark.195 While
these new schools range in affiliation, it is the small independent Muslim schools that
have been highly contested in the media.196 The government has responded by altering its
free school tradition.
The DPP has outwardly criticized private Muslim schools for low quality
education and teachers. However, their critiques clash with a 2006 Ministry of Education
study that showed 41% of the pupils in Muslim independent schools progressed into
upper secondary school, against a national average of 26%.197 Nonetheless, the criticism
of private Muslim schools led to policy changes under the Liberal-Conservative coalition
government. For example, a school appointed supervisor must be certified by the
Ministry and master Danish in speech and writing unless at a school with state permission
to teach another language.198 In 2011, under the left wing Social Democrat government,
similar policies increased and the supervision of independent schools only intensified.199
Today,  “centralized  and  decentralized  forms  of  government  are  interwoven  in  a  new  
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way”  and  the victims tend to be the small Muslim schools.200 Changes in evaluation
techniques and increased multi-cultural education in Danish public schools has perhaps
pacified members of the international community such as OECD, but it has not stopped
the growing cultural divide between Muslim immigrants and ethnic Danes.
Meanwhile, private schools are also on the rise in big cities where parents of
ethnic Danish origin choose to keep their children separate from immigrant majority
public schools.201 This  trend  in  ‘free  schools’  has  been  recently  addressed  by  scholar,  
Christer Gerdes. By taking socioeconomic status in to account, he demonstrates that
pupils in private schools tend to have lower mathematical and written Danish scores than
those in public schools.202 His research suggests that parents, to some extent, choose to
send their children to private school for reasons beyond academic promise. While factors
like religion or perceived educational superiority could come into play, he hypothesizes
the role of racial and religious prejudices.203 While this is less contested in the media, the
possibility  of  a  “native  flight”  of  Danes  from  public  education  paints  a  worrying  future  
for Muslim integration.
In the conclusion of his study of the education of Pakistani Danes, Rytter predicts
that as Islamophobia continues to penetrate Danish society, the more educated Pakistani
Danes will immigrate to Sweden leaving the less educated to subsist largely off the
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Danish welfare system.204 This prediction can be expanded to the greater population of
Muslim immigrants. If Muslim immigrants feel that they are unable to give their children
the education they have worked towards, it is safe to predict a mass emigration of those
who have built up the means to do so. If the Danish government does not apply reforms
to public schools more rapidly or address the expansion and selective repression of
private schools, it may experience a greater welfare drain issue in its future.

The future of the welfare state
Immigration undoubtedly disrupts the homogenous, small nation that is perceived
as the ideal home to the welfare state. However, historically, Denmark has publicly
embraced the effects of globalization in order to serve as an international player. In their
article  “Small  is  Resilient—the Impact of Globalization on Denmark,” Klaus Nielsen and
Stefan Kesting state that the Danish government has been able to bring the neo-liberalism
of the increasingly globalized world into the arms of the welfare state through a
continuous restructuring of a thoroughly developed state infrastructure and society.205
Regrettably, they state that the xenophobic attitudes of groups such as the DPP have
thrown the fate of the welfare state as a whole and that of Denmark as an international
power into dire question. Nielsen and Kesting lament: 206
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Overall, the impact of glowing globalization trends on Denmark's negotiated
economy seems to resemble a Viking ship in rough sea. To stay the course and
avoid wreckage one has to rely heavily on a social consensus about the intended
direction and ensure the collaboration of all crew members through a certain
degree of solidarity and equality. In the rough sea of globalization, the political
elite is engaged in efforts to steer the ship, eager to utilize its new opportunities
while many ordinary citizens are worried about the costs. It remains to be seen
whether this recent split can be healed or signifies the emergence of persistent
disruptions in the social consensus.
In other words, the DPP hinders the societal transformations Denmark requires to both
profit from the growth of globalization and maintain the established welfare system.
According to the rhetoric of the DPP, immigration reflects the fundamental issue
with the welfare system; that it steals from the very ethnic Danes who fund it. This
compelling stance coupled with blatant Islamophobia has allowed the DPP to have a
profound influence on the type and amount of social services provided to immigrants.
Refugees have had their stipends cut and their communities dispersed, the right to choose
a spouse has been drastically restricted, and the Danish education system has been
unable, and in the case of private school codes, unwilling, to incorporate immigrant
Muslim students. This uncovers a serious paradox in Danish social services: it works to
actively push out the very Muslim immigrants who could repay, or even strengthen, the
welfare state while leaving the poor and needy in the warm embrace of Danish tax
payers. The Danish welfare state is not evolving with globalization; it is withering under
the political and social influence of right wing populism.
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CHAPTER 5: THE REFUGEE AND ASYLUM SYSTEM

From the freest to the strictest
Denmark is recognized as the first state to ratify the 1951 UNHCR Convention, a
milestone in refugee and asylum rights. About thirty years later, the Danish Government
proudly unveiled its 1983 Aliens Act as the most liberal refugee legislature in the world.
However, in 2002, a new Aliens Act was enacted; this time it was revered as the strictest
in the world.207 Rapid changes in the political environment brought the Danish asylum
system from one extreme position to the other.
In the wake of the destabilizing Arab uprisings, the detrimental aftermath of the
Iraqi War, and the protracted and bloody Syrian Civil War, Muslim refugees are in
desperate  need  of  a  safe  haven.  However,  the  routine  defamation  and  ‘otherizing’  of  
Muslims in the Danish media and the fear of immigrant infringement on the welfare state
during the Liberal-Conservative government culminated in restrictive measures against
asylum-seekers. These measures range from policies specifically aimed at decreasing the
number of accepted asylum cases to a decrease in funding for refugee-supporting NGOs.
I will begin by addressing the adoption of stringent criteria for becoming a Danish
refugee which has both decreased the number of refugees in Denmark and increased the
number of refugees waiting in limbo at deportation sites. This will supplement a
discussion of the lack of advocacy for refugee rights in both the Danish Parliament and in
Danish civil society.
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In the previous chapter, the shortcomings of the Spatial Dispersal policy and the
welfare benefits of refugees were addressed. This chapter will examine the steps before
and after the Danish welfare system comes into play: The acceptance or rejection of
refugees into Denmark as asylum-seekers and the eventual acceptance or rejection of
those granted asylum as Danish citizens. The increasing strictness, and stunning
arbitrariness, of these decision making processes reflect a heavy right wing populist
influence and, by extension, an Islamophobic bias.

An anti-alien Alien Package
The  new  “Alien  Package”  of  2002  drastically  changed  the  Danish  asylum  process.    
The controversial bill begins with the following statement which aptly summarizes its
political  roots  and  motivations:  “The  Government  and  the  Danish  Peoples  Party  agree  
that  the  number  of  aliens  coming  to  denmark  must  be  restricted...”208 The  “Alien  
Package”  was  a  product  of  the  Liberal-Conservative government of former prime
minister,  Anders  Fogh  Rasmussen,  and  relied  on  the  Danish  People’s  Party  for  a  
Parliamentary majority. The new package completed its goal of decreasing the number of
aliens, but it was mostly to the detriment of refugees. Before the stringent bill even
passed,  its  “signal  value”  caused  a  decline  in  asylum  applications,  mostly  from  Iraq  and  
Afghanistan.209 After it was firmly in place, the Danish Immigration Service, the DIS,
drastically increased their number of asylum rejections, from a 50% rejection rate in 2002
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to 90% in 2005.210 The decreased amount of asylum-seekers and grantees can be
attributed to stricter refugee conditions, harsher application procedures and, arguably,
arbitrary selection choices that reflect the biases of DIS officers.
The most influential transformation in the new Alien package on incoming
refugees  was  the  Danish  government’s  replacement  of  the  “de  facto”  clause  with  its  
weaker  successor,  “status  B.”  The  de  facto  clause  offered  asylum  to  refugees who were
not clearly covered by the 1951 UNHCR Convention. This included, but was not limited
to, those fleeing active war service, those without sufficient documentary evidence and
those fleeing because of a subjective fear of their chaotic home country.211 While  the  “de  
facto”  clause  began  rather  informally  in  the  1960s,  it  was  codified  in  the  previous  1983  
Aliens Act.212 It continued to grow in scope and, eventually, about two thirds of the
accepted refugees were accepted through the de facto code. This means that only one
third of asylum grantees were covered by the 1951 Convention.213 However, in 2002 it
was  replaced  with  “status  B”  which  promises  asylum  to  refugees  who,  in  addition  to  the  
conditions in the 1951 Convention, risk the death penalty, torture or inhumane
punishment.  While  this  may  seem  fair  on  paper,  these  “extra”  areas  of  coverage  are  
already in the Convention and therefore do not offer asylum-seekers any legal leeway
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like its legislative predecessor.214 In fact, some even argue that by ignoring  “chaotic”  
situations  and  issues  of  proper  documentary  evidence,  “status  B”  works  in  violation  of  
the European Council of Human Rights.
As of 2002, thousands of refugees seeking asylum in Denmark were no longer
eligible and were either denied entrance  or  feared  deportation.    “Status  B”  had  the  most  
detrimental  effect  on  Somali  aliens  who  were  nearly  all  “de  facto”  refugees.  While  
Somalis feared their chaos in their country, they could not prove that they would be
subject to inhumane treatment upon their return.215 Some scholars, such as Kim U. Kjær,
a former researcher at the Danish Institute of Human Rights, have argued that the
deportation of aliens such as the Somali refugees violates ECHR article 3, the prohibition
of inhumane punishment or torture.216 He cites Ahmed vs. Austria, a case in which
Austria was sued for deporting a refugee to a country with chaotic conditions.217 Kjær
argues that the decrease in the number of refugees, while domestically perceived as a
national gain, is countered by a loss of respect in the European community. By violating
article of the EHCR, Danish reforms are led in the opposite direction of those reforms
suggested by the Council of Europe, a symbolic and political mistake.218 A similar
political misstep took place nine years later. In 2011, at the end of the LiberalConservative  government’s  administration,  the  DPP  pressed  for  the  reinstatement  of  
border controls. The move was seen internationally as a challenge to the Schengen
214

Kim, 261.

215

Kim, 264.

216

Kim, 265.

217

Ibid.

218

Kim, 272-275.

71

accord, sending shockwaves through Europe and proving that international political
agreements  would  not  hinder  the  seriousness  of  the  right  wing’s  animosity  towards  
foreigners.219
There  were  several  other  aspects  of  the  “Alien  Package”  that  made  it  undesirable  
to asylum seekers, especially those coming from the Middle East. For example, rather
than being able to lodge applications at local embassies, asylum seekers must be present
in Denmark. As a result, difficulty attaining visas often equates to an un-reviewed asylum
application.220 More importantly, was the decision to limit the number of seats on the
Refugee Board, those who make the final decision on asylum statuses, from five to three
seats. The two seats that were cut belonged to the only NGO represented on the board,
the Danish Refugee Council. Kjær argues that this hurt the legitimacy of the Board by
abolishing  the  seats  that  could  “act  as  an  independent  guarantor  of  due  process  taking  into  
account  the  requisite  humanitarian  considerations.”221 However, the DRC is not the only
NGO to rapidly decline in  influence.  Many  NGOs  in  the  early  stages  of  the  “Alien  
Package”  felt  their  government  financial  support  and  advocacy  steadily  waning  while  
others complained of personal DPP attacks.222 For example, the Rehabilitation and
Research Centre for Torture Victims was forced to give up broader advocacy work and
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continue  on  a  “paid  per  session”  basis.223 Without civil sector advocacy, refugees are
more susceptible to systematic discrimination.

Hospitality has its limits
The need for more civil sector and human rights involvement in the Danish
asylum process is of paramount importance when one considers its lacking influence
prior to the Alien Package. In 2005, Edith Montgomery and Anders Foldspang published
a disturbing article regarding the predictors of asylum decisions in Denmark. Using data
from 149 refugee families who entered Denmark in 1992, they concluded that the
selection process favored refugees who were better socially and culturally situated. Most
notably,  if  the  family’s  religion  was  another  than  Islam, it was positively associated with
a residence permit. Therefore, their findings demonstrate a diminishing role of human
rights violations in asylum decisions even before the 2002 crack-down.224 Without the
Danish Refugee Council and other NGOs advocating against discrimination in asylum
decisions, one should fear for the future of Muslim asylum seekers in Denmark.
The discrimination against Muslim refugees became clear under Birthe Rønn
Hornbech, The Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs from 2007 to
2011. Despite being a loyal member of the right-wing Liberal Party, her statements often
took members of parliament by surprise. Against the will of her own party, she
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disapproved of headscarf bans.225 However, her hospitality did not extend to Muslim
refugees. In 2009, to the shock of the international community and after an agreement to
offer asylum to a certain number of Iraqi quota refugees, Rønn Hornbech rescinded her
Iraqi quota and replaced it with Burmese refugees. A clear reason was not given to
explain  the  decision  other  than  the  Danish  government  had  “very  good  experience  in  
integrating  Burmese”226 However, the fact that a less controversial Buddhist group
replaced the more media-centric Muslim refugees should not be overlooked. While this
example  only  hints  at  Rønn  Hornbech’s  discriminatory  bias,  the  events  of  March  2011  
more strongly it. Evidence eventually surfaced about the failure to grant Danish
citizenship to stateless Palestinians born in Denmark, a blatant violation of international
law.227 Rønn Hornbech was quickly dismissed, but the discrimination has not been
forgotten among the Palestinian Danish population as several Palestinians are still
demanding financial compensation.228
The limitations of Danish hospitality is further explained  in  Ulrik  Pram  Gad’s  
paper  for  the  Norwegian  Institute  of  International  Affairs,  “Conditions for Hospitality or
Defense of Identity?: Writers in need of Refuge- A Case of Denmark's 'Muslim
relations.’”  In  it,  he  discusses  the  discriminatory  language in the 2008 bill passed in
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Parliament  to  include  Denmark  in  the  “International  Cities  of  Refuge”  network  for  
writers escaping persecution. The fleeing writers are not granted asylum rights in
Denmark  like  in  many  other  “Cities  of  Refuge”  locations.229 Instead, the writers must
sign  a  “Declaration  of  recognition  of  the  fundamental  values  of  Danish  Society”  and  
agree to leave the country within two years. In the words of Pam Gad, their stay is
“conditional”  and  the  declaration  is  basically  a  “caricature  catalogue of the vices of
Muslims, as they appear in Danish debates on integration.230”  The  writers,  who  are  
carefully not described as refugees in Danish debate and legislature, must agree to give
up the cultural traits the Danish government identifies them with. This list of imposed
traits includes undermining democracy, oppressing or disrespecting women and children,
and supporting acts of terrorism.231 By  using  the  “Cities  of  Refuge”  bill  as  an  example,  
Pram  Gad  concludes  that  the  Danish  government  follows  a  “Making us good by listing
their  vices”  approach  in  its  legislature  in  order  to  not  “compromise  the  homogeneity  of  
Denmark.232”  In  other  words,  hospitality  for  refugees  seems  to  have  its  limits  when  
Muslims are concerned.

The woes of permanent residence
If granted asylum, the residence of the refugee is expected to be temporary. The
eventual repatriation and reintegration of the refugees to their home country is naturally
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the preferred solution. Accordingly, the Danish Act of Repatriation offers a 12 month
leeway for repatriated refugees to return to Denmark. Unfortunately, this focus on
repatriation   can   lead   to   “circular   repatriation,”   the   unsuccessful   reintegration   of  
repatriated refugees who then return to Denmark.233 A 2008 UNHCR study analyzes the
circular repatriation of Iraqis with refugee status in Denmark. Of 306 repatriated Iraqis,
76 returned to Denmark within their allotted time. The reasons for their return ranged
from indirect economic pressure to leave Denmark to direct pressure from their
individual caseworkers. In almost all cases, their desire to leave Denmark was greater
than their desire to return home.234 Repatriation rather than integration seems to take the
forefront for those with Danish refugee status. However, many refugees do not want to
live in Denmark, but cannot return home. This does not bode well for their eventual
return to Danish society.
Despite the pressure to repatriate, those still vying for permanent residence in
Denmark may rely on their mental illness. Specific mental health problems can lead to a
humanitarian residence permit. However, a humanitarian residence permit will only last
two years before the refugee needs to reapply, with the same basis as before. 235 In other
words, if the refugee wants to stay in Denmark, he or she must still be mentally ill. In
their article regarding the rights of children in this asylum system, Kathrine Vitus and
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Hilde   Liden   argue   that   this   route   towards   humanitarian   residence   is   “paradoxical”  
because   it   possibly   “encourages   a   deterioration   in   the asylum-seekers’   mental   and  
physical health as a way of receiving asylum.236”  Nonetheless,  it  is  one  of  the  very  few  
routes available towards a residence permit.
In the rare cases a permanent residence permit is given, the route to citizenship
has been personally attacked during the Liberal-Conservative government. As of 2007,
the citizenship test was directly from the textbook Danmark Før og Nu, Denmark Past
and Present, which was taught in Danish language schools to prepare residents for the
test.237 However, with pressure from the DPP, the test was suddenly changed in
September 2008 and the new guidelines were not posted until November. The change
seemed like a direct attack on applicants who had registered relying on the old
conditions. Headmasters of language schools tried to fight the rapid change, but their
struggle was to no avail.238 The pass rate dropped suddenly from 97% to 23.5% in
December 2008.239 The unexpected change and stark decline in pass rates supports the
theory that it was an attack on the extension of Danish citizenships. After the guidelines
had been posted for a longer time and students had a fair amount of study time, the pass
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rate plateaued at 42.1% in June 2009.240 Nonetheless, the questions of the new test faced
serious criticisms
Seven questions on this new citizenship test were questioned as imprecise, while
one was quickly proven blatantly incorrect. Difficult questions like, what was the Danish
population in the Viking era, were nearly unanswerable by Danish citizens themselves.241
A 2010 study at a Danish High School showed that 2 out of 3 high school level social
studies students were unable to pass the test.242 Similarly, but more shockingly, another
study around the same time revealed that, despite 84% of DPP members approving of the
strict text, only every third member could pass it.243 The goal of this test was not to make
Danish citizens; the test was a ploy to prevent the growth in number of Danish citizens.

The forgotten: camps and children
In my prison research, the most depressing section to visit was the deportation
floor.244 The silence on this floor in comparison to the rest of the prison could have
several explanations: they were depressed about facing deportation because of their
crime, they lacked human contact because of language barriers, or they were just
completely isolated from the rest of the prison community. Nonetheless, with only a few
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inmates occupying the section, the floor seemed oddly void of conversation or activity.
Even among the wider prison community, those who feared deportation in the future
were clearly taking steps that distanced themselves from the other inmates and, by
extension, the wider Danish community. For example, a few potential deportees
explained that they chose English language classes over Danish classes because if they
were deported the Danish language is futile; a valid point that unfortunately and
inadvertently undermines attempts at Prison integration. Issues of loneliness, isolation
and integration are representative of issues among refugees facing the constant threat of
deportation in Danish asylum camps.
Those  refugees  known  as  “phase  3  rejected  asylum  seekers”  are  faced  with  time,  
ranging from a few days to dozens of years, at an asylum camp.245 These refugees are
either held up by administrative and bureaucratic processes or are refusing to return to
their home country. Most of these refugees come from Iraq, Iran and Somalia, countries
that Denmark has no treaty allowing for the forced return of asylum-seekers.246 The
largest and most controversial camp is in Sandholm, a Suburb of Copenhagen. Many
journalists  have  travelled  to  Sandholm  to  comment  on  its  overarching  depressive  “feeling  
of   uncertainty.”247 While the conditions are not bad, one of the denied asylum seekers
compares her temporary  home  of  12  years  to  “a  grave”  because  she  “feel[s]  like  a  dead  
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person in it- with no future, nothing.248”   Meanwhile,   no   changes   have   been   made   to  
account for these long, possibly indefinite, stays.
A 2008 BBC article discusses how Sandholm and its Danish counterparts are only
built to last people one or two years, despite its long term occupants. Most notably, how
education cannot develop with the asylum-seekers rendering their education and skills
virtually useless. In the article, Mads Carstensen, former head of training at the Danish
Red   Cross,   laments   “You   spend   all   this   time   in   the   Danish   asylum   system   without  
working, without using your skills, and eventually you become passive. You lose your
ability to act for yourself."249 This forced passivity does not help alleviate the mental
problems of those already in the camp. A 2007 study by Amnesty International of 142
people at Sandholm Camp, most of whom were from Iraq, Iran or Syria, revealed that
65% fulfilled the symptom criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder. Amnesty
International concluded its report by stating that this vulnerable group required attention
and aid that they were not receiving.250
Scholars have also begun to question the legality of this forced passivity in
regards to its compliance with   the   Children’s   Rights   Convention.   The   vast   majority   of  
children   attend   asylum   schools   for   “reception   level”   classes   that   have   fewer   hours   and  
subjects than the public school system. Additionally, with a deficient number of
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multilingual teachers, the asylum schools find themselves out of compliance with the
CRC’s  right  to  equal  opportunity  and  education.251 Other criticisms of CRC compliance
include   a   random   process   of   selection   that   ignore   the   child’s   health   and,   by   extension,  
denying them the rights of   “individual   personality”   or   a   “place   in   the   decision   making  
process.”252However, the CRC, like other aforementioned international conventions,
finds itself outside of Danish legal and public discourse.253 If the residents of the camps,
including the children, are ever able to enter Danish society, they will be unable to
contribute. Until then, they wait.
Even though Sandholm refugees have no education or job opportunities available
to   them   outside   the   camp’s   gates,   they   are   typically   allowed   to   leave   and   return freely.
However, this freedom was restricted by the most notable piece of legislation to reach the
camps   in   years,   the   2008   “Law   69.”   After   three   Tunisian   Muslim   asylum-seekers in
Sandholm were suspected of plotting an attack on cartoonist, Kurt Westergaard, the
illustrator  of  the  infamous  “Muhammad  bomb-turban”  cartoon,  they  were  forced  to  check  
in with authorities every day. In December 2008, under pressure from the DPP, this
precaution   was   extended   to   every   refugee   in   Sandholm.   Law   69,   nicknamed   “the
Tunisian   law,”   only   affects Sandholm camp refugees. Rønn Hornbech introduced this
“Special   law,”   meaning   an   unusually   specific   and   quickly   implemented   law   generally  
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effected by public opinion, which was then supported by the DPP.254 It has since been
called a waste of resources for adding to the bureaucracy of camp procedures, illegal for
changing the contract of those already in the camp, and Islamophobic for its roots in the
Cartoon Crisis.255256

The future of the refugee and asylum system
The Danish refugee and asylum system as it stands presents two serious problems
that stem from the right wing populist influence during the Liberal-Conservative
coalition. Firstly, it is being questioned by scholars for its compliance with international
and European code. While the reinstatement of border controls that challenged the
Schengen accord have since been rescinded by the current Social-Democrat government,
most of the internationally questionable refugee legislation remains intact. Most notably,
the replacement of  the  asylum  “de  Facto”  clause  with  “status  B,”  which  moves  in  the  
opposite direction of reforms encouraged by the European Council of Human Rights.
Furthermore, the CRC remains unaddressed in Danish refugee discourse. Secondly, the
pressure for repatriation, difficulty in gaining asylum and the mentally trying and
isolationist life in Danish refugee camps mostly likely hinders refugee integration into
and appreciation of Danish society. What remains is a system that is increasingly
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detached from international legislation and a refugee population, mostly Muslim, who
feel increasingly unwelcome in what they see as a hostile and discriminatory country.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Right wing populism in Denmark

The election of 2001 brought a Liberal-Conservative coalition into power. They
would remain in a place of political supremacy for ten years. This assent of the rightwing in Danish politics relied on the continued support of the DPP, the first powerful
Nordic right wing populist party. The Danish electorate is attracted to the nationalist
platform that the DPP claims ownership of. However, the electorate understanding of
nationalism  hinges  on  the  protection  of  the  “Danish  way  of  life”  from  a  perceived  threat,  
in this case, a Muslim population with conflicting values. An Islamophobic right wing
populist discourse has since colored Danish political debate.

The political and social environments in Denmark since 2001 have worked to
hinder rather than bolster successful integration of Muslim immigrants. A significant
portion of the Danish media, arguably influenced and supported by the government,
functions  under  an  “us-vs.  them”  paradigm  framed  by  the  extreme  right  in  Danish  
politics. Furthermore, a welfare system has emerged that withholds rights from
immigrants  who  must  first  prove  their  “Danishness,”  an  arbitrary  term  defined  by  right  
wing populist rhetoric. Cultural misunderstandings have culminated in an outward
movement of both Muslim and ethnic Danes from the Danish public school system and
the growth of private schools that are divided along religious lines. Lastly, the strict
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refugee and asylum system functions to further isolate Muslims from Danish culture. The
rise of right wing populist power has made Denmark a country where Muslim immigrants
feel increasingly unwelcome.
The explosion of right wing populist policy and rhetoric in Denmark that seems to
specifically ostracize Muslim immigrants and their descendants could have profound
consequences both domestically and internationally. Firstly, media crises, like the
“Cartoon  Crisis”  of  2005,  endanger both Danes and foreigners. While it seems that the
Danish government is better equipped to respond to such crises in the future, there still
needs to be a shift in media dialogue. Muslims need to  become  part  of  “Danishness”  as  it  
is portrayed by the media not to undermine governmental attempts at integration.
Secondly, if Muslims feel generally ostracized or limited by Danish social services, they
may emigrate out of Denmark. These emigrants will be those successful enough to afford
passage and they will leave before they have an opportunity to repay the welfare system
that had thus far funded them. Thirdly, by pushing refugees away, sometimes keeping
them isolated in camps, Danish asylum policies can further hinder the future integration
of its refugees who may end up resenting and, therefore, not contributing to the country
that begrudgingly took them in. This can also lead to detrimental isolation from the
international arena. If the Danish media, social services and refugee and asylum system
continue to be heavily influenced by right wing populism, I predict that Danish policies
will also contribute to the spread of vitriolic rhetoric throughout Europe. In other words,
the  legitimacy  of  a  “liberal”  state  behaving  illiberally  is  a  potentially  dangerous  
phenomenon.
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I will now offer suggestions for further study and commentary on the future of the
Danish state in relationship to Muslim immigrants. This will be done through an analysis
of the current political climate and a critique of the modern understanding of integration
into  Denmark,  into  the  “Danish  way  of  life.”  However,  before  embarking  on  these  
thoughts, it is important to pay homage to the legitimate arguments of the DPP.

The allure of the far right
Before the DPP gained parliamentary power, there was a prevailing sense of
uncertainty regarding the future of Denmark, that is, the future of the small welfare state
in the wake of ever increasing globalization. This fear of the social and economic future
spanned across the Danish political spectrum. Danes from a variety of political parties
turned to the DPP because it seemed like the only party to offer clear solutions. In fact, in
2001, 25% of DPP voters used to vote for the left-wing Social Democratic Party and 10
to 12% of DPP voters were supporters of the far left Socialist People's Party.257 If Danish
society was to become multi-ethnic, the Danish citizens wanted to know under which
conditions and at what speed.258 The DPP had an answer: slow the stream of migration to
a trickle and integrate those immigrants into Danish culture and society. Furthermore, the
DPP  eschewed  the  ‘political  correctness’  that  many  voters  had  long  felt  was  limiting  
necessary political discourse. In the words of political scientist, Eva Østergaard-Nielsen,
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the  DPP  “initiated  a  veritable  crusade  against  elitist  `opinion-makers.'”259 The DPP
offered Danes a populist understanding of the future of their country; an undeniably
alluring concept.
My research has not been a scholarly attempt to bring Denmark closer to a
multiculturalist agenda; a system in which every culture is allowed to function separately
and outside of the confines of a Danish communal identity. In fact, Anders Per Rudling
summarizes my sentiments best when stating, “No  society  is  so  void  of  values  that  it  can  
provide  that  “neutral”  cultural  framework  which  multiculturalists  so  desire.  The  process  
of  constructing  this  “neutral”  society  – itself an oxymoron - necessarily includes the
retreat from liberal democratic values.260”  The Danes are a small citizenry with a deeplyrooted heritage. The importance placed on a united community in Danish society would
make the very establishment of a multicultural state an infringement on their democracy.
Their language,  culture,  and  that  illusive  and  undefinable,  “Danish  way  of  life”  will  
continue to pulse through the streets of Copenhagen and the rolling hills of Northern
Jutland. I truly understand the emotional significance of clinging to the Danish identity.
It is a culture I grew up with and hold very dear. Nonetheless, I have serious trepidations
about the DPP and their influence on several sectors of Danish society. The systematic
construction  of  an  “other”  through  a  right  wing  populist  agenda  is  an  unacceptable means
of sustaining a culture that, in reality, is under no impending threat.
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Same game, new playing field
Unfortunately, there is a serious gap in data from the last few years of the
Liberal-Conservative coalition to today. Since the shock of the “Cartoon Crisis”  has  worn  
off, data regarding how Muslims are portrayed in the Danish media or how they are
treated in the Danish asylum system are virtually not existent. This is a grave mistake.
Denmark’s  small  size  should  not  deter  from  academic  research. It is important to analyze
the continuing evolution of the treatment of immigrants to uncover the influence of right
wing populist parties in Europe. Furthermore, continued research is important on the
domestic front as it seems that the future of Denmark will include a strong right wing
populist voice.
With the victory of Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt and her party, the
Social Democrats, the premiership of the Liberal-Conservative coalition came to an end
in late 2011 and, by extension, the direct influence of the DPP began to whither. As
stated earlier, the citizenship test is now passable and border controls repealed. However,
other than these two alterations, the Social-Democrats have changed few of the
Islamophobic policies of their predecessors. Nonetheless, Thorning-Schmidt is
increasingly unpopular among the Danish electorate. Her politics are increasingly
unpopular and internal criticism from her own party is rampant.261 Political experts are
predicting that she will either resign in the immediate future to take a position among the
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EU or that she will simply lose the next election.262 It seems increasingly likely that the
vacuum left by her retirement or loss of support will be filled by parties that have
internalized the extreme rhetoric the DPP.
It is very plausible that the Liberal Party, with the voter support of the DPP, will
win the next election, bringing the DPP back to its 2001-2011 level of political
traction.263 I suggest that Danish citizens recognize the role of right wing populism in the
failures of integrationist policies when casting their ballots. If the DPP increases its
influence in Parliament, and more importantly, its influence over the Danish electorate, I
hope  they  can  expand  their  limited  understanding  of  “Danishness”  to include Muslim
immigrants. Otherwise, I predict integrationist policies will continue to ostracize rather
than integrate Muslims and that Denmark may become a breeding ground for extremist
rhetoric, ostracizing itself from the globalized European community.

Exploring  “Danishness”
Integration  does  not  mean  expunging  the  heritage  of  one’s  descendants  or  
shunning  one’s  religion  in  order  gain  the  respect  of  fellow  citizens.  In  her  work,  
“Transnationalism  and  Ethnonational  Diasporism,”  Gabriel  Sheffer  defines integration as
“various  degrees  of....learning  to  operate  socially,  politically,  and  economically  within  
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the host land while maintaining cultural separation.264”  In  other  words,  it  is  possible  to  be  
Danish, function in Danish society, and celebrate Ramadan. Nonetheless, I recognize that
if Muslims function on the fringes of society, living off Danish welfare and shutting off
their wider community, they will continue to be defined outside the realm of what is
Danish. Integration is crucial, but it needs to be done separately from right wing populist
rhetoric. Integration is a dual process that involves mutual understanding and respect. It
requires an acceptance of a level of hybridity among identities. The right wing populist
policies and rhetoric beginning in 2001 have slowly worked to break this dual process on
both  sides:  It  places  Muslims  in  a  category  wholly  different  from  “Danishness”  in  the  
eyes of ethnically Danish citizens and it builds up resentment of the Danish state in the
eyes of Muslim immigrants and their descendants.
Any  Dane  can  easily  discern  the  imposed  attributes  of  the  Muslim  ‘other’  in  
public Danish discourse. If a Muslim beats his children, he is a Muslim, not a Dane. If a
Muslim woman wears a hijab she is a victim of the Islamic patriarchy, not a Dane. If a
Muslim  has  qualms  with  notions  widely  considered  “liberal,”  he  is  an  example  of  the  
anti-democratic Muslim state, not a Dane. Most notably, if a Muslim openly practices his
religion, he is a zealot, not a Dane. The list can go on, but  the  point  is  that  “Danishness”  
is  defined  by  what  “Danishness”  is  not.  However,  ethnically  Danish  citizens  who  commit  
a crime or have conservative beliefs are still considered Danish by the wider public.
Therefore,  it  seems  that  “Danishness,”  as  it  is  described by the prevailing right wing
populist rhetoric, has one main criterion: to not be Muslim. This hypocrisy in a country
that champions liberal ideals is what his paper has tried to unveil.
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APPENDIX A: ABRIDGED OBSERVATIONS
“The  Danish  Prison  Experience”  Research  Project  at  Nyborg  Fængsel from June 2012
through July 2012.
(Only observations considered prevalent to this paper have been included.)
Location

Guard
House

Middle
Section

Observation

Interpretation

Ethical Issues/
Further
Questions
Guards stress on
This serves as evidence What  does  “like  
numerous occasions that for the argument that the humans”  really  
they always try to
Prison works as a
mean? It is
remain calm, treat
microcosm for the
possible that the
inmates  “like  humans”  
society it is in.
guards are just
(no matter their crime)
telling me what
and that they do not
they think I, an
believe in using force
outsider, would
unless absolutely
like to hear.
necessary (a life is on
However,
the line).
considering I
never witnessed
force from a guard
I assume the
violence part is
true.
I often shake hands with This serves as evidence
prisoners and introduce for the argument that the
myself.
Prison works as a
microcosm for the
society it is in.
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It is possible that
prisoners were
trying to impress
me, the outsider.
However, the
behavior seemed
normal.

Location

Middle
Section

Observation

Interpretation

Ethical Issues/
Further
Questions
I am taught that the This serves as evidence Perhaps only
Prison’s  “Middle   for the argument that the those  “typical  
Section”  houses  the  
Prison works as a
inmates”  (those  
“typical  inmate”  (about   microcosm for the
who do not
20 in each section).
society it is in.
require isolation)
Each inmate pays for his
are the only ones
own TV, food, does his
that the
own  cooking…It  
microcosm theory
reminds me of a little
applies to.
village.

Middle
Section

Some prisoners were This can both serve both
not given work because as evidence for and
there was not enough
against the argument
work to go around. In that the Prison works as
this case, they received a microcosm for the
unemployment money.
society it is in.
If they do work they can
make an average of 500
kroner (about $93) per
week.

Does the
unemployment in
the prison
compare to the
unemployment
level in Danish
society?

Several
Prison
wings

“Weak”  prisoners  are   These  “weak”  inmates  
Does the
kept separate for their should not be included exclusion of these
own protection. This
in a microcosm
“weak”  inmates  
includes ex-gang
approach
from  the  “Middle  
members, sexual
section”  delineate
offenders, those who are
from  the  “typical”  
“easily  influenced,”  and  
inmates
drug addicts.
“normalization”  
process.

Hospital
There is a dentist and This serves as evidence I would like to
wing
physical therapist which for the argument that the know the statistics
inmates can pay for.
Prison works as a
on who can afford
They seem to be
microcosm for the
such treatment.
regularly used.
society it is in.
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Location

Observation

Interpretation

Ethical Issues/
Further
Questions
This can symbolize the Why has another
“blame  the  imam”  
imam not been
approach followed
hired (is there
during  the  “Cartoon really not a single
Crisis.”  This  is  a  very   Imam in Denmark
important observation. that  does  not  “rile  
up”  inmates)?  Are  
Muslim inmates
upset about this?

On-site
Church

Church can convert into
any other religious
establishment, but there
is only a priest on staff.
Apparently, they
discontinued the use of
Imams because they
“riled  up”  the  Muslim  
inmates who are
“usually  not  religious.”  
This happened during
the Muhammad Cartoon
Crisis of 2005, but no
other information is
offered by Prison
Guard.

Muslim
prayer
room

Very nice room.
Perhaps Muslim inmates What would
However, it is never are not inspired to pray happen if one
used by inmates. Sense
without an Imam
Muslim inmate
of abandonment.
present in their lives.
started going to
This interpretation
the prayer room?
insinuates that the Would a barrier of
Prison is hindering the fear be broken and
public demonstrations
would others
of Islam. Another
attend to. Would
interpretation is that there be a demand
Muslim inmates are for a new Imam?
really not religious.
Would he be
Finally, it can be
ostracized by the
interpreted that the
wider prison
inmates maybe feel
community,
uncomfortable about
including other
Islam and do not attend Muslim inmates
the prayer room in an or would nobody
attempt  to  “fit  in.”  All  
care?
of these interpretations
have obvious societal
implications.
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Location

On-site
School

Workshops

Observation

Interpretation

Ethical Issues/
Further
Questions
School is a choice for Another example of the Of those that
everyone  in  the  “middle   “Middle  section”  being   choose English
section”  and  they  get   an example of wider
over Danish
paid for attending.
Danish society. The
because of a
English is the most commonality of English specific fear of
commonly requested over Danish classes is deportation, how
class (much greater than
an important
many are actually
Danish). After asking an
observation. It
deported? Being a
inmate of Middle
demonstrates that the White, American
Eastern descent the
fear of deportation
observer the
response I got was:
stemming from harsh inmate may have
many of the prisoners immigration and asylum just been telling
are going to be deported
laws can hinder
me what he
following their sentence integration into Danish thought would
so learning Danish
society.
sound interesting.
would be futile.
However, most inmates
are just already fluent in
Danish.
Various types of
This serves as evidence Do most inmates
workshops available. for the argument that the utilize these
Some of these trades
Prison works as a
certificates upon
offer certificates of
microcosm for the
release?
completion which can
society it is in.
be used to find
employment following
release.
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Location

Observation

Interpretation

Workshops I am taken aback by a
These stereotypical
statement from the
views are commonworkshop teacher who
placed, perhaps
states that the Polish representing beliefs in
have an aptitude for
wider society
making shoes and
Africans have an
aptitude for welding.
This blatant racist
stereotype is said very
nonchalantly and caused
no response from
surrounding inmates.
Workshops

Middle
Section

An issue that I notice
with job training is that
the manuals are often in
only Danish or English
which not all the
prisoners understand,
but teachers work hard
to accommodate.

This could represent
issues in the Danish
schooling system in
wider society.

Ethical Issues/
Further
Questions
Perhaps this
teacher was an
anomaly.

Are these inmates
who have Danish
as a second or
third language
learning Danish in
the language
schools? If not,
why?

Often the line between This serves as evidence
Perhaps
prison guards, teachers, for the argument that the relationships are
and inmates is not
Prison works as a
accentuated for
clearly defined because
microcosm for the
me, the outsider.
many are so friendly
society it is in.
together  I  often  couldn’t  
tell who is who.
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Location

Middle
Section

Observation

Interpretation

Ethical Issues/
Further
Questions
Many things have
This can both serve both How do budget
changed because a lack as evidence for and cuts in the prison
of funds; for example, against the argument compare to cuts in
they were moving out that the Prison works as other parts of
all the billiards tables
a microcosm for the
Danish society?
because they were too society it is in. Perhaps
expensive to keep up. budget issues hinder the
Also there is a huge area “normalization”  process  
outside of the prison
or maybe it reflects
that used to be a giant
economic issues in
garden for inmates to
wider society.
work  at,  but  it  wasn’t  
affordable.

Middle
Section

All men under 18 must This serves as evidence
go to school or training. for the argument that the
They are well aware of
Prison works as a
their educational and
microcosm for the
professional
society it is in.
opportunities because of
the  “Skadhauge  plan”  
(an informational packet
they are given upon
arrival.)

Do those with
lacking Danish or
English skills
properly
understand all
their professional
and educational
opportunities?

Guard
House

There is a conference at
Representative of
the prison trying to
changes in society
recruit more workers of trying to incorporate a
different ethnicities. more ethnically diverse
workforce.

How many of
Middle Eastern
descent were
actually hired?
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Location

Observation

Deportation There are two inmates
Section
in separate cells far
away from each other.
The guard comments it
is a very boring floor
because there are few
guards on duty and the
inmates rarely speak
Danish or English. He
also says, if they do
speak English or Danish
they are too sad or
angry to communicate
with guards. They are
not offered the same
education/work
opportunities. I leave
floor feeling very
depressed. One inmate
looks as though he had
been crying. Neither
speaks to me.

Interpretation

Ethical Issues/
Further
Questions
Very important
Do any of these
observation for the
inmates try to
demoralization of
return to
deportation. Could
Denmark? I did
represent Danish asylum not spend a lot of
camps.
time in this
section so my
observation could
have been an
anomaly.
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Location

Observation

Interpretation

Ethical Issues/
Further
Questions
On-site There are two out of 12 There are two possible On average, what
drug
openly Muslim inmates. interpretations. Firstly,
is the
treatment
Both are of Middle perhaps Muslim inmates representation of
center
Eastern descent. One fit in with no problems Muslims in the
from Iraq, the other
in Danish prison
drug treatment
does not tell me his
society. Or, perhaps in center compared
country of origin. Both the  “safe”  environment  
to the
seem well liked by other of the treatment center, representation of
inmates.
solidarity in recovery
Muslims in the
overcomes other ethnic prison as a whole?
and religious tensions. Were the Muslim
inmates friends
with the other
men before
coming to the
treatment center?
Will they remain
close after?
On-site
drug
treatment
center

The Iraqi in the Drug
treatment center gets
excited about the fact
that I know a little
Arabic. He tries to teach
me Arabic over a few
meals. (I am eating
meals with inmates in
the Drug treatment
center)

He is proud and
unashamed of their
Middle Eastern and
Muslim culture.

Is this only a
representation of
behavior in the
“safe”  
environment of
the treatment
center?

On-site
drug
treatment
center

Waiting lists for
treatment centers
because they are very
desired but also very
hard to qualify for.
Everyone eats together
(staff included) at
treatment centers.

Lines are further blurred
between inmates and
guards which can be
used as evidence for the
argument that the Prison
works as a microcosm
for the society it is in.
However, its exclusivity
also hinders this theory.

Once again, I
wonder, on
average, what is
the representation
of Muslims in the
drug treatment
center compared
to the
representation of
Muslims in the
prison as a whole?
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Location

Observation

Interpretation

On-site
Other Muslim inmate Further demonstrates
drug
gets caught with drugs friendship and solidarity
treatment
and is kicked out of
between all inmates in
center center. Some men cry at drug recovery, no matter
his departure. The Iraqi
their ethnicity or
inmate refuses to
religion. However, the
believe his friend is “conspiracy  theory”  of  
guilty and tells me it is a the other Muslim inmate
conspiracy among the could reflect a distrust
guards.
of Danish authority.
On-site
drug
treatment
center

Ethical Issues/
Further
Questions
Once again, I
wonder, were the
Muslim inmates
friends with the
other men before
coming to the
treatment center?
Will they remain
close after?

The inmates are very
Demonstrates that I
Am I honored
upset to learn they
have  begun  to  “fit  in”   with the same
cannot go to the store and my presence is not trust and respect
the day of my birthday perceived as unnatural.
as a guard,
because they wanted to
another inmate or
bake me a cake.
none of the
above?
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY AND RESPONSES
Survey sent out to employees in the Danish Prison Service (English Translation by
author)
1. Gender?
Male
Female
2. How long have you worked in the Danish Prison Service?
1 year
2 years
3 years
4 years
5 years
6 years
7 years
8 years
9 years
10 years
11 years
12 years
13 years
14 years
15 years
16 years
17 years
18 years
19 years
20 years or more
3. How often do you socialize with colleagues outside of the workplace?
Often
I have many friends from work and we socialize outside of the workplace.

Sometimes
I sometimes meet with colleagues outside of the workplace.

Never
I have no friends from work and I do not socialize with colleagues outside of the workplace.

4. How did you become interested in the Prison Service?
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5. Describe your job position?

6. Have  you  noticed  a  trend  of  “cliques”  among  the  prisoners?  (A  group  that  stays  
together and excludes others)
Yes
Inmates ALWAYS form groups

Sometimes
Inmates OCASSIONALLY form groups

Never
Inmates NEVER form groups.

7. When prisoners form cliques/groups, what do you think is the basis for their
formation?
You may well highlight more of the following answers.
(If you answered "No" to Question 6 please jump to question 8)
Ethnicity
Inmates of common ethnic background come together to form a group

Crime
Inmates who committed the same type of crime come together to form a group

Age
Inmates of a similar same age group come together to form a group

Religion
Inmates of the same religious background come together to form a group

Coincidence
Inmates form groups without seeming to have anything in common

Other

8. After the controversial publishing of Muhammad cartoons in Jyllands-Posten in 2005,
did you notice a change in behavior among inmates from the Middle East?
I was not working within the prison system at the time.
I did not notice any change in behavior.
If you noticed a change in behavior, please describe what you observed:
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9. Do you observe that current events in the news affect the behavior of inmates?
Yes
I OFTEN see that events in the news affect the behavior of inmates

Sometimes
I SOMETIMES see that events in the news affect the behavior of inmates

Never
I NEVER see that events in the news affect the behavior of inmates

10. In the time you have worked in the prison system, have you witnessed fights over
ethnic or religious disagreements?
I have NEVER seen fights among the inmates of ethnic or religious disagreements.
I have a SINGLE fight among inmates over ethnic or religious disagreements.
I have seen SEVERAL fights among the inmates of ethnic or religious disagreements.
I OFTEN see fights among the inmates of ethnic or religious disagreements.
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